
ABUSE.MOM — BEHAVE OR GET EXPOSED
| Signature | Description | Points | Severity |
|---|---|---|---|
| Danger strong hits: 3 | High-risk paths: shells, RCE vectors, exploits | +75 | |
| Danger medium hits: 2 | Medium-risk: admin panels, config files | +20 | |
| POST requests present | Behavioral anomaly detected by automated analysis | +8 |
Reconstructed HTTP requests from server access logs. Target domains redacted for security.
* Typical request patterns for detected signatures. Actual target domains are redacted.
Block 177.39.66.183 at the network perimeter. Implement defense-in-depth combining IP blocking with application-layer protections.
This IP was checked against major DNS-based blacklists used by mail servers and firewalls worldwide.
Checked: Spamhaus, SpamCop, Barracuda, SORBS, CBL, UCEProtect. Results may change over time.
177.39.66.183 has been assigned a threat score of 103/100 (Critical). With this rating, the IP falls into the critical severity bracket — among the most dangerous addresses in our monitoring database.
Network traffic from 177.39.66.183, located in Viamão, Brazil, operating on the network of Vero S.A, has been classified as malicious by our automated threat scoring engine. During its 1-day observation window, we recorded 1 hostile requests from this IP — roughly 1 per day on average. Operating from a residential network, this IP may represent a compromised home gateway or IoT device that has been drafted into a larger attack infrastructure. With 102 flagged addresses, Brazil represents a significant presence in our threat database. With a threat score of 103/100, this IP is among the most dangerous addresses in our database. Immediate and complete blocking is strongly recommended.
This IP is classified as residential, suggesting it may belong to a compromised home device, IoT botnet member, or an infected personal computer. Residential IPs involved in attacks often indicate malware infection without the owner's knowledge.
Subdomain takeover occurs when DNS records point to decommissioned services. Attackers claim the abandoned resource and serve content under the trusted domain, enabling cookie theft, phishing, and reputation damage.
SSRF attacks trick servers into making requests to internal resources that should not be publicly accessible. This can expose cloud metadata endpoints, internal APIs, and private network services, potentially leading to full infrastructure compromise.