
ABUSE.MOM — BEHAVE OR GET EXPOSED
| Signature | Description | Points | Severity |
|---|---|---|---|
| Burst 28/2s | Abnormally fast request rate — automated scanning | +35 | |
| Burst 29/10s | Abnormally fast request rate — automated scanning | +35 | |
| UA changed | Multiple User-Agents — bot rotation technique | +25 |
Reconstructed HTTP requests from server access logs. Target domains redacted for security.
* Typical request patterns for detected signatures. Actual target domains are redacted.
IP 173.46.91.147 is generating excessive traffic. Limit connections per source IP. Enable geographic blocking if traffic from this region is unexpected.
IP 173.46.91.147 shows suspicious UA behavior. Block empty User-Agent requests. Implement JavaScript-based bot detection for sensitive endpoints.
This IP was checked against major DNS-based blacklists used by mail servers and firewalls worldwide.
Checked: Spamhaus, SpamCop, Barracuda, SORBS, CBL, UCEProtect. Results may change over time.
173.46.91.147 has been assigned a threat score of 95/100 (Critical). With this rating, the IP falls into the critical severity bracket — among the most dangerous addresses in our monitoring database.
The following attack categories were identified:
Our monitoring infrastructure has identified 173.46.91.147, geolocated to Vancouver, Canada, operating on the network of Colocation America Corporation, as a source of suspicious network activity. During its 2-day observation window, we recorded 128 hostile requests from this IP — roughly 64 per day on average. This residential IP is likely a compromised consumer device. Home routers and IoT equipment with default credentials are prime targets for botnet operators. The dual attack vectors of Request Flooding combined with User-Agent Anomaly indicate a coordinated assault rather than opportunistic scanning. At 95/100, this is an extremely high-risk address. All traffic should be considered hostile.
This IP is classified as residential, suggesting it may belong to a compromised home device, IoT botnet member, or an infected personal computer. Residential IPs involved in attacks often indicate malware infection without the owner's knowledge.
Distributed denial of service attacks overwhelm infrastructure with traffic volume. Effective mitigation combines always-on traffic scrubbing, anycast network distribution, rate limiting, and the ability to quickly scale absorption capacity during attacks.
Request smuggling exploits differences in how front-end and back-end servers parse HTTP requests. This technique can bypass security controls, poison web caches, and hijack other users sessions by desynchronizing request boundaries.