
ABUSE.MOM — BEHAVE OR GET EXPOSED
| Signature | Description | Points | Severity |
|---|---|---|---|
| 404 ratio 40-60% | Majority of requests returned 404 — enumeration | +15 | |
| Danger medium hits: 1 | Medium-risk: admin panels, config files | +10 | |
| Danger strong hits: 2 | High-risk paths: shells, RCE vectors, exploits | +50 | |
| Directory Scan | Behavioral anomaly detected by automated analysis | +0 |
Reconstructed HTTP requests from server access logs. Target domains redacted for security.
* Typical request patterns for detected signatures. Actual target domains are redacted.
Block scanning from 173.239.211.31: rate-limit 404 responses per IP, deploy a honeypot 404 page, ensure no backup files are web-accessible.
Other blocked IPs from the same /24 subnet — indicates systematic abuse from this network range.
This IP was checked against major DNS-based blacklists used by mail servers and firewalls worldwide.
Checked: Spamhaus, SpamCop, Barracuda, SORBS, CBL, UCEProtect. Results may change over time.
173.239.211.31 has been assigned a threat score of 100/100 (Critical). This places it in the critical threat category. Immediate blocking is strongly advised across all network perimeters.
The following attack categories were identified:
The address 173.239.211.31 originates from New York, United States, operating on the network of F.N.S. HOLDINGS LIMITED. It was identified through automated analysis of incoming network traffic across monitored endpoints. The address has been active for 137 days in our monitoring system, producing 451 flagged requests at a rate of ~3.3/day. The IP exhibits directory enumeration behavior, systematically requesting non-existent paths to discover hidden files and misconfigured resources. United States currently accounts for 151 blocked IPs in our database, making it a significant source of malicious traffic. A score of 100/100 places this address in the top tier of severity. Block and investigate any historical connections.
Request smuggling exploits differences in how front-end and back-end servers parse HTTP requests. This technique can bypass security controls, poison web caches, and hijack other users sessions by desynchronizing request boundaries.
Analyzing User-Agent strings reveals automated tools masquerading as legitimate browsers. Inconsistencies between claimed browser capabilities and actual behavior, impossible version combinations, and known scanner signatures help identify malicious clients.