
ABUSE.MOM — BEHAVE OR GET EXPOSED
| Signature | Description | Points | Severity |
|---|---|---|---|
| UA changed for same IP | Multiple User-Agents — bot rotation technique | +25 | |
| Danger strong hits: 362 | High-risk paths: shells, RCE vectors, exploits | +100 | |
| Danger medium hits: 959 | Medium-risk: admin panels, config files | +60 | |
| Burst: 14 req / 2s | Abnormally fast request rate — automated scanning | +35 | |
| Burst: 51 req / 10s | Abnormally fast request rate — automated scanning | +35 | |
| Burst: 50 req / 10s | Abnormally fast request rate — automated scanning | +35 | |
| Danger strong hits: 318 | High-risk paths: shells, RCE vectors, exploits | +100 | |
| Danger medium hits: 833 | Medium-risk: admin panels, config files | +60 | |
| Burst: 13 req / 2s | Abnormally fast request rate — automated scanning | +35 | |
| Burst: 47 req / 10s | Abnormally fast request rate — automated scanning | +35 | |
| Danger strong hits: 2 | High-risk paths: shells, RCE vectors, exploits | +50 | |
| Danger medium hits: 14 | Medium-risk: admin panels, config files | +60 | |
| Burst: 10 req / 2s | Abnormally fast request rate — automated scanning | +35 | |
| Burst: 14 req / 10s | Abnormally fast request rate — automated scanning | +35 | |
| Danger strong hits: 99 | High-risk paths: shells, RCE vectors, exploits | +100 | |
| Burst: 11 req / 2s | Abnormally fast request rate — automated scanning | +35 | |
| Burst: 39 req / 10s | Abnormally fast request rate — automated scanning | +35 | |
| Danger strong hits: 44 | High-risk paths: shells, RCE vectors, exploits | +100 | |
| Danger medium hits: 126 | Medium-risk: admin panels, config files | +60 | |
| Burst: 40 req / 10s | Abnormally fast request rate — automated scanning | +35 | |
| Burst: 37 req / 10s | Abnormally fast request rate — automated scanning | +35 | |
| Danger strong hits: 356 | High-risk paths: shells, RCE vectors, exploits | +100 | |
| Danger medium hits: 936 | Medium-risk: admin panels, config files | +60 | |
| Burst: 12 req / 2s | Abnormally fast request rate — automated scanning | +35 | |
| Burst: 41 req / 10s | Abnormally fast request rate — automated scanning | +35 | |
| Danger strong hits: 68 | High-risk paths: shells, RCE vectors, exploits | +100 | |
| Danger medium hits: 184 | Medium-risk: admin panels, config files | +60 | |
| Burst: 36 req / 10s | Abnormally fast request rate — automated scanning | +35 | |
| Danger strong hits: 103 | High-risk paths: shells, RCE vectors, exploits | +100 | |
| Danger medium hits: 9 | Medium-risk: admin panels, config files | +60 | |
| Burst: 38 req / 10s | Abnormally fast request rate — automated scanning | +35 | |
| Danger strong hits: 294 | High-risk paths: shells, RCE vectors, exploits | +100 | |
| Danger medium hits: 775 | Medium-risk: admin panels, config files | +60 | |
| Danger strong hits: 28 | High-risk paths: shells, RCE vectors, exploits | +100 | |
| Burst: 35 req / 10s | Abnormally fast request rate — automated scanning | +35 | |
| Danger strong hits: 71 | High-risk paths: shells, RCE vectors, exploits | +100 | |
| Burst: 34 req / 10s | Abnormally fast request rate — automated scanning | +35 | |
| Danger strong hits: 13 | High-risk paths: shells, RCE vectors, exploits | +100 | |
| Burst: 18 req / 10s | Abnormally fast request rate — automated scanning | +35 | |
| Danger strong hits: 242 | High-risk paths: shells, RCE vectors, exploits | +100 | |
| Danger medium hits: 621 | Medium-risk: admin panels, config files | +60 | |
| Danger strong hits: 131 | High-risk paths: shells, RCE vectors, exploits | +100 | |
| Danger medium hits: 90 | Medium-risk: admin panels, config files | +60 | |
| Danger strong hits: 245 | High-risk paths: shells, RCE vectors, exploits | +100 | |
| Danger medium hits: 656 | Medium-risk: admin panels, config files | +60 | |
| Danger strong hits: 102 | High-risk paths: shells, RCE vectors, exploits | +100 | |
| Danger medium hits: 1 | Medium-risk: admin panels, config files | +10 |
Reconstructed HTTP requests from server access logs. Target domains redacted for security.
* Typical request patterns for detected signatures. Actual target domains are redacted.
Address UA spoofing from 173.239.196.140: maintain blocklist of known malicious UA strings, require consistent UA across sessions, implement TLS fingerprinting.
Implement limit_req_zone in nginx. Deploy CDN with DDoS protection. Configure SYN cookies and connection tracking to throttle 173.239.196.140.
Other blocked IPs from the same /24 subnet — indicates systematic abuse from this network range.
This IP was checked against major DNS-based blacklists used by mail servers and firewalls worldwide.
Checked: Spamhaus, SpamCop, Barracuda, SORBS, CBL, UCEProtect. Results may change over time.
173.239.196.140 has been assigned a threat score of 255/100 (Critical). This is a critical-level threat. Systems administrators should treat this IP as hostile and block all inbound connections without exception.
The following attack categories were identified:
Our monitoring infrastructure has identified 173.239.196.140, geolocated to Yangon, MM, operating on the network of F.N.S. HOLDINGS LIMITED, as a source of suspicious network activity. During its 1-day observation window, we recorded 20 hostile requests from this IP — roughly 20 per day on average. This is a residential IP address, suggesting a compromised home device such as a router, smart appliance, or infected workstation participating in a botnet. Two attack patterns were identified (User-Agent Anomaly and Request Flooding), suggesting a semi-automated campaign that targets multiple vulnerabilities. Our records show 31 malicious IPs originating from MM, positioning it as a notable contributor to global threat activity. With a threat score of 255/100, this IP is among the most dangerous addresses in our database. Immediate and complete blocking is strongly recommended.
This IP is classified as residential, suggesting it may belong to a compromised home device, IoT botnet member, or an infected personal computer. Residential IPs involved in attacks often indicate malware infection without the owner's knowledge.
TLS fingerprinting creates unique identifiers based on how clients negotiate encrypted connections. The JA3 and JA4 methods generate hashes from TLS ClientHello parameters, enabling identification of specific tools and malware regardless of IP address changes.
Subdomain takeover occurs when DNS records point to decommissioned services. Attackers claim the abandoned resource and serve content under the trusted domain, enabling cookie theft, phishing, and reputation damage.