
ABUSE.MOM — BEHAVE OR GET EXPOSED
| Signature | Description | Points | Severity |
|---|---|---|---|
| UA suspicious (short/empty) | Behavioral anomaly detected by automated analysis | +15 | |
| Danger strong hits: 3 | High-risk paths: shells, RCE vectors, exploits | +75 |
Reconstructed HTTP requests from server access logs. Target domains redacted for security.
* Typical request patterns for detected signatures. Actual target domains are redacted.
Address UA spoofing from 172.71.148.106: maintain blocklist of known malicious UA strings, require consistent UA across sessions, implement TLS fingerprinting.
Other blocked IPs from the same /24 subnet — indicates systematic abuse from this network range.
This IP was checked against major DNS-based blacklists used by mail servers and firewalls worldwide.
Checked: Spamhaus, SpamCop, Barracuda, SORBS, CBL, UCEProtect. Results may change over time.
172.71.148.106 has been assigned a threat score of 90/100 (Critical). A score this high marks a critical threat actor. This address has demonstrated persistent, aggressive malicious behavior across multiple detection vectors.
The following attack categories were identified:
Our monitoring infrastructure has identified 172.71.148.106, geolocated to Frankfurt, Germany, operating on the network of Cloudflare, Inc., as a source of suspicious network activity. Over a period of 1 days, this IP generated 1 malicious requests, averaging approximately 1 requests per day. This address belongs to a datacenter or cloud hosting provider. Hosting IPs are frequently leveraged by threat actors who rent cheap VPS instances specifically for conducting attacks. The IP exhibits User-Agent manipulation, switching between different browser identities or sending empty headers. Our records show 193 malicious IPs originating from Germany, positioning it as a significant contributor to global threat activity. At 90/100, this is an extremely high-risk address. All traffic should be considered hostile.
This IP belongs to a hosting or data center provider. Malicious traffic from hosting infrastructure often originates from compromised VPS instances, rented servers used for scanning campaigns, or abused free-tier cloud accounts. Hosting providers typically respond to abuse reports within 24-72 hours.
TLS fingerprinting creates unique identifiers based on how clients negotiate encrypted connections. The JA3 and JA4 methods generate hashes from TLS ClientHello parameters, enabling identification of specific tools and malware regardless of IP address changes.
DNS amplification exploits open resolvers to reflect and amplify traffic toward victims. A small query triggers a large response directed at the spoofed source IP, achieving amplification factors of 50x or more, overwhelming target bandwidth.