
ABUSE.MOM — BEHAVE OR GET EXPOSED
| Signature | Description | Points | Severity |
|---|---|---|---|
| UA suspicious (short/empty) | Behavioral anomaly detected by automated analysis | +15 | |
| Danger strong hits: 6 | High-risk paths: shells, RCE vectors, exploits | +100 | |
| Danger medium hits: 238 | Medium-risk: admin panels, config files | +60 | |
| 404 ratio 40-60% | Majority of requests returned 404 — enumeration | +15 | |
| Probe pattern 302->404 same path | Behavioral anomaly detected by automated analysis | +20 | |
| Burst: 44 req / 2s | Abnormally fast request rate — automated scanning | +35 | |
| Burst: 139 req / 10s | Abnormally fast request rate — automated scanning | +35 | |
| Burst: 50 req / 2s | Abnormally fast request rate — automated scanning | +35 | |
| Danger strong hits: 12 | High-risk paths: shells, RCE vectors, exploits | +100 | |
| Danger medium hits: 357 | Medium-risk: admin panels, config files | +60 | |
| Burst: 51 req / 2s | Abnormally fast request rate — automated scanning | +35 | |
| Burst: 141 req / 10s | Abnormally fast request rate — automated scanning | +35 | |
| Danger strong hits: 9 | High-risk paths: shells, RCE vectors, exploits | +100 | |
| Burst: 48 req / 2s | Abnormally fast request rate — automated scanning | +35 | |
| Burst: 151 req / 10s | Abnormally fast request rate — automated scanning | +35 | |
| Danger medium hits: 237 | Medium-risk: admin panels, config files | +60 | |
| Burst: 55 req / 2s | Abnormally fast request rate — automated scanning | +35 | |
| Burst: 46 req / 2s | Abnormally fast request rate — automated scanning | +35 | |
| Burst: 149 req / 10s | Abnormally fast request rate — automated scanning | +35 |
Reconstructed HTTP requests from server access logs. Target domains redacted for security.
* Typical request patterns for detected signatures. Actual target domains are redacted.
Address UA spoofing from 172.213.226.43: maintain blocklist of known malicious UA strings, require consistent UA across sessions, implement TLS fingerprinting.
IP 172.213.226.43 is enumerating directories. Configure fail2ban apache-404 jail after 10+ 404 errors. Disable directory listings. Normalize all 404 responses.
Implement limit_req_zone in nginx. Deploy CDN with DDoS protection. Configure SYN cookies and connection tracking to throttle 172.213.226.43.
Other blocked IPs from the same /24 subnet — indicates systematic abuse from this network range.
This IP was checked against major DNS-based blacklists used by mail servers and firewalls worldwide.
Checked: Spamhaus, SpamCop, Barracuda, SORBS, CBL, UCEProtect. Results may change over time.
172.213.226.43 has been assigned a threat score of 280/100 (Critical). A score this high marks a critical threat actor. This address has demonstrated persistent, aggressive malicious behavior across multiple detection vectors.
The following attack categories were identified:
Threat intelligence analysis has linked 172.213.226.43 to malicious activity originating from Milan, Italy, operating on the network of Microsoft Corporation. The address has been under observation since its initial detection. Over a period of 1 days, this IP generated 6 malicious requests, averaging approximately 6 requests per day. Operating from datacenter infrastructure, this IP is typical of addresses used in organized attack operations. Cloud and VPS providers are commonly exploited as launching platforms for automated scanning. The diversity of 3 separate attack methods suggests a comprehensive attack toolkit — likely an automated scanner that tests for vulnerabilities across multiple categories. Italy currently accounts for 101 blocked IPs in our database, making it a significant source of malicious traffic. With a threat score of 280/100, this IP is among the most dangerous addresses in our database. Immediate and complete blocking is strongly recommended.
This IP belongs to a hosting or data center provider. Malicious traffic from hosting infrastructure often originates from compromised VPS instances, rented servers used for scanning campaigns, or abused free-tier cloud accounts. Hosting providers typically respond to abuse reports within 24-72 hours.
TLS fingerprinting creates unique identifiers based on how clients negotiate encrypted connections. The JA3 and JA4 methods generate hashes from TLS ClientHello parameters, enabling identification of specific tools and malware regardless of IP address changes.
SSH servers face constant brute force attacks targeting common usernames and weak passwords. Key-based authentication, fail2ban, non-standard ports, and IP allowlisting dramatically reduce the attack surface. Monitoring auth logs reveals active campaigns and compromised credentials.