
ABUSE.MOM — BEHAVE OR GET EXPOSED
| Signature | Description | Points | Severity |
|---|---|---|---|
| UA suspicious (short/empty) | Behavioral anomaly detected by automated analysis | +15 | |
| Danger strong hits: 42 | High-risk paths: shells, RCE vectors, exploits | +100 | |
| Danger medium hits: 692 | Medium-risk: admin panels, config files | +60 | |
| Burst: 111 req / 2s | Abnormally fast request rate — automated scanning | +35 | |
| Burst: 200 req / 10s | Abnormally fast request rate — automated scanning | +35 | |
| Danger medium hits: 691 | Medium-risk: admin panels, config files | +60 | |
| Burst: 48 req / 2s | Abnormally fast request rate — automated scanning | +35 | |
| Burst: 151 req / 10s | Abnormally fast request rate — automated scanning | +35 | |
| Danger strong hits: 21 | High-risk paths: shells, RCE vectors, exploits | +100 | |
| Danger medium hits: 346 | Medium-risk: admin panels, config files | +60 | |
| Burst: 34 req / 2s | Abnormally fast request rate — automated scanning | +35 | |
| Burst: 111 req / 10s | Abnormally fast request rate — automated scanning | +35 | |
| Danger strong hits: 12 | High-risk paths: shells, RCE vectors, exploits | +100 | |
| Danger medium hits: 88 | Medium-risk: admin panels, config files | +60 | |
| 404 ratio 40-60% | Majority of requests returned 404 — enumeration | +15 | |
| Probe pattern 302->404 same path | Behavioral anomaly detected by automated analysis | +20 | |
| Burst: 56 req / 2s | Abnormally fast request rate — automated scanning | +35 | |
| Burst: 90 req / 10s | Abnormally fast request rate — automated scanning | +35 | |
| Danger strong hits: 18 | High-risk paths: shells, RCE vectors, exploits | +100 | |
| Burst: 52 req / 2s | Abnormally fast request rate — automated scanning | +35 | |
| Burst: 135 req / 10s | Abnormally fast request rate — automated scanning | +35 |
Reconstructed HTTP requests from server access logs. Target domains redacted for security.
* Typical request patterns for detected signatures. Actual target domains are redacted.
IP 172.213.0.120 shows suspicious UA behavior. Block empty User-Agent requests. Implement JavaScript-based bot detection for sensitive endpoints.
IP 172.213.0.120 is generating excessive traffic. Limit connections per source IP. Enable geographic blocking if traffic from this region is unexpected.
IP 172.213.0.120 is enumerating directories. Configure fail2ban apache-404 jail after 10+ 404 errors. Disable directory listings. Normalize all 404 responses.
Other blocked IPs from the same /24 subnet — indicates systematic abuse from this network range.
This IP was checked against major DNS-based blacklists used by mail servers and firewalls worldwide.
Checked: Spamhaus, SpamCop, Barracuda, SORBS, CBL, UCEProtect. Results may change over time.
172.213.0.120 has been assigned a threat score of 280/100 (Critical). This represents a critical risk level. Our detection systems have flagged multiple high-confidence indicators of malicious intent from this address.
The following attack categories were identified:
172.213.0.120 is registered in Milan, Italy, operating on the network of Microsoft Corporation. This IP first appeared in our threat feeds after triggering multiple behavioral detection signatures. Over a period of 3 days, this IP generated 5 malicious requests, averaging approximately 1.7 requests per day. The IP is classified as hosting/datacenter infrastructure, commonly associated with rented servers used for automated attack campaigns, botnet command-and-control, or vulnerability scanning at scale. The diversity of 3 separate attack methods suggests a comprehensive attack toolkit — likely an automated scanner that tests for vulnerabilities across multiple categories. Italy currently accounts for 101 blocked IPs in our database, making it a significant source of malicious traffic. With a threat score of 280/100, this IP is among the most dangerous addresses in our database. Immediate and complete blocking is strongly recommended.
This IP belongs to a hosting or data center provider. Malicious traffic from hosting infrastructure often originates from compromised VPS instances, rented servers used for scanning campaigns, or abused free-tier cloud accounts. Hosting providers typically respond to abuse reports within 24-72 hours.
TLS fingerprinting creates unique identifiers based on how clients negotiate encrypted connections. The JA3 and JA4 methods generate hashes from TLS ClientHello parameters, enabling identification of specific tools and malware regardless of IP address changes.
VPN exit nodes aggregate traffic from many users, creating mixed reputation profiles. While legitimate users seek privacy, attackers exploit VPN services to anonymize malicious activity, making IP-based blocking of VPN nodes a complex policy decision.