
ABUSE.MOM — BEHAVE OR GET EXPOSED
| Signature | Description | Points | Severity |
|---|---|---|---|
| Form spam: no_js_check | Spam/malware keywords in request content | +0 |
Reconstructed HTTP requests from server access logs. Target domains redacted for security.
* Typical request patterns for detected signatures. Actual target domains are redacted.
IP 170.168.242.104 is flooding forms with spam. Implement time-based tokens and block IPs submitting more than 5 forms per hour.
Other blocked IPs from the same /24 subnet — indicates systematic abuse from this network range.
This IP was checked against major DNS-based blacklists used by mail servers and firewalls worldwide.
Checked: Spamhaus, SpamCop, Barracuda, SORBS, CBL, UCEProtect. Results may change over time.
170.168.242.104 has been assigned a threat score of 70/100 (High). This score indicates high threat severity. The IP has shown clear patterns of malicious behavior that warrant immediate defensive measures.
Network traffic from 170.168.242.104, located in Hendrik-Ido-Ambacht, Netherlands, operating on the network of Alex Largman, has been classified as malicious by our automated threat scoring engine. During its 1-day observation window, we recorded 1 hostile requests from this IP — roughly 1 per day on average. The IP is classified as hosting/datacenter infrastructure, commonly associated with rented servers used for automated attack campaigns, botnet command-and-control, or vulnerability scanning at scale. With 35 flagged addresses, Netherlands represents a notable presence in our threat database. A threat score of 70/100 places this IP in the high-risk category. Blocking at the firewall level is recommended.
This IP belongs to a hosting or data center provider. Malicious traffic from hosting infrastructure often originates from compromised VPS instances, rented servers used for scanning campaigns, or abused free-tier cloud accounts. Hosting providers typically respond to abuse reports within 24-72 hours.
SQL injection remains one of the most common web attack vectors. Attackers inject malicious SQL code through input fields to extract database contents, modify data, or gain administrative access. Automated scanners test for SQLi vulnerabilities at massive scale.
Race conditions occur when application behavior depends on the timing of concurrent operations. Attackers exploit these timing windows to bypass limits, duplicate transactions, or escalate privileges by sending carefully timed parallel requests.