
ABUSE.MOM — BEHAVE OR GET EXPOSED
| Signature | Description | Points | Severity |
|---|---|---|---|
| 404 ratio >= 60% | Majority of requests returned 404 — enumeration | +25 | |
| UA bot: curl | Known bot/crawler User-Agent detected | +40 |
Reconstructed HTTP requests from server access logs. Target domains redacted for security.
* Typical request patterns for detected signatures. Actual target domains are redacted.
Block scanning from 170.168.173.162: rate-limit 404 responses per IP, deploy a honeypot 404 page, ensure no backup files are web-accessible.
Address UA spoofing from 170.168.173.162: maintain blocklist of known malicious UA strings, require consistent UA across sessions, implement TLS fingerprinting.
This IP was checked against major DNS-based blacklists used by mail servers and firewalls worldwide.
Checked: Spamhaus, SpamCop, Barracuda, SORBS, CBL, UCEProtect. Results may change over time.
170.168.173.162 has been assigned a threat score of 65/100 (High). The IP is rated as a high-level threat. Network administrators should implement blocking rules and monitor for any connections from this address.
The following attack categories were identified:
The address 170.168.173.162 originates from De Wilp, Netherlands, operating on the network of Alex Largman. It was identified through automated analysis of incoming network traffic across monitored endpoints. Our sensors captured 92 malicious requests from this address across a 4-day span, reflecting a sustained attack cadence of ~23 requests per day. This IP is identified as a VPN or proxy endpoint, commonly used to mask the true origin of attack traffic and bypass geographic or reputation-based blocking. The dual attack vectors of Path Enumeration combined with User-Agent Anomaly indicate a coordinated assault rather than opportunistic scanning. Netherlands currently accounts for 105 blocked IPs in our database, making it a significant source of malicious traffic. The score of 65/100 warrants active monitoring and rate-limiting. Full blocking is advisable for sensitive systems.
This IP is associated with a VPN or proxy service. Attackers frequently route their traffic through anonymizing services to obscure their true location. This makes attribution more challenging but the malicious behavior patterns remain detectable.
TLS fingerprinting creates unique identifiers based on how clients negotiate encrypted connections. The JA3 and JA4 methods generate hashes from TLS ClientHello parameters, enabling identification of specific tools and malware regardless of IP address changes.
Modern phishing operations use sophisticated infrastructure including lookalike domains, valid TLS certificates, and evasion techniques like cloaking and geofencing. Analyzing this infrastructure reveals campaigns before they reach their targets.