
ABUSE.MOM — BEHAVE OR GET EXPOSED
| Signature | Description | Points | Severity |
|---|---|---|---|
| Danger strong hits: 9 | High-risk paths: shells, RCE vectors, exploits | +100 | |
| Danger medium hits: 2 | Medium-risk: admin panels, config files | +20 |
Reconstructed HTTP requests from server access logs. Target domains redacted for security.
* Typical request patterns for detected signatures. Actual target domains are redacted.
Block 168.231.90.47 at the network perimeter. Implement defense-in-depth combining IP blocking with application-layer protections.
Network reconnaissance data from Shodan. Open ports may indicate running services, misconfigurations, or potential attack surfaces.
| Port | Service | Risk | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| 443 | HTTPS | Low | HTTPS web server — encrypted web traffic |
Data source: Shodan InternetDB. Scanned independently of abuse.mom.
This IP was checked against major DNS-based blacklists used by mail servers and firewalls worldwide.
Checked: Spamhaus, SpamCop, Barracuda, SORBS, CBL, UCEProtect. Results may change over time.
168.231.90.47 has been assigned a threat score of 120/100 (Critical). A score this high marks a critical threat actor. This address has demonstrated persistent, aggressive malicious behavior across multiple detection vectors.
Our monitoring infrastructure has identified 168.231.90.47, geolocated to São Paulo, Brazil, operating on the network of HOSTINGER BR, as a source of suspicious network activity. The address has been active for 1 days in our monitoring system, producing 1 flagged requests at a rate of ~1/day. This address belongs to a datacenter or cloud hosting provider. Hosting IPs are frequently leveraged by threat actors who rent cheap VPS instances specifically for conducting attacks. At 120/100, this is an extremely high-risk address. All traffic should be considered hostile.
This IP belongs to a hosting or data center provider. Malicious traffic from hosting infrastructure often originates from compromised VPS instances, rented servers used for scanning campaigns, or abused free-tier cloud accounts. Hosting providers typically respond to abuse reports within 24-72 hours.
Request smuggling exploits differences in how front-end and back-end servers parse HTTP requests. This technique can bypass security controls, poison web caches, and hijack other users sessions by desynchronizing request boundaries.
Race conditions occur when application behavior depends on the timing of concurrent operations. Attackers exploit these timing windows to bypass limits, duplicate transactions, or escalate privileges by sending carefully timed parallel requests.