
ABUSE.MOM — BEHAVE OR GET EXPOSED
| Signature | Description | Points | Severity |
|---|---|---|---|
| UA changed for same IP | Multiple User-Agents — bot rotation technique | +25 | |
| Danger medium hits: 70 | Medium-risk: admin panels, config files | +60 | |
| 404 ratio 40-60% | Majority of requests returned 404 — enumeration | +15 | |
| Probe pattern 302->404 same path | Behavioral anomaly detected by automated analysis | +20 | |
| Burst: 5 req / 2s | Abnormally fast request rate — automated scanning | +35 | |
| Foreign referer seen | Referer from unrelated external domain | +10 | |
| Imported from old blocklist | Behavioral anomaly detected by automated analysis | +0 | |
| Danger medium hits: 6 | Medium-risk: admin panels, config files | +60 | |
| Danger medium hits: 10 | Medium-risk: admin panels, config files | +60 | |
| Danger medium hits: 12 | Medium-risk: admin panels, config files | +60 | |
| Danger medium hits: 4 | Medium-risk: admin panels, config files | +40 | |
| Danger medium hits: 16 | Medium-risk: admin panels, config files | +60 | |
| Danger medium hits: 20 | Medium-risk: admin panels, config files | +60 | |
| Danger medium hits: 8 | Medium-risk: admin panels, config files | +60 | |
| Danger medium hits: 2 | Medium-risk: admin panels, config files | +20 | |
| 404 ratio >= 60% | Majority of requests returned 404 — enumeration | +25 | |
| Danger medium hits: 3 | Medium-risk: admin panels, config files | +30 | |
| Danger medium hits: 5 | Medium-risk: admin panels, config files | +50 |
Reconstructed HTTP requests from server access logs. Target domains redacted for security.
* Typical request patterns for detected signatures. Actual target domains are redacted.
Address UA spoofing from 162.212.153.56: maintain blocklist of known malicious UA strings, require consistent UA across sessions, implement TLS fingerprinting.
Block scanning from 162.212.153.56: rate-limit 404 responses per IP, deploy a honeypot 404 page, ensure no backup files are web-accessible.
IP 162.212.153.56 is generating excessive traffic. Limit connections per source IP. Enable geographic blocking if traffic from this region is unexpected.
Network reconnaissance data from Shodan. Open ports may indicate running services, misconfigurations, or potential attack surfaces.
| Port | Service | Risk | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| 3389 | RDP | High | Remote Desktop Protocol — primary target for ransomware attacks |
⚠️ Network scanning reveals 1 dangerous service exposed on 162.212.153.56. Exposed RDP (3389) is the #1 entry point for ransomware attacks. These services should not be publicly accessible without strict firewall rules.
Data source: Shodan InternetDB. Scanned independently of abuse.mom.
This IP was checked against major DNS-based blacklists used by mail servers and firewalls worldwide.
Checked: Spamhaus, SpamCop, Barracuda, SORBS, CBL, UCEProtect. Results may change over time.
162.212.153.56 has been assigned a threat score of 165/100 (Critical). A score this high marks a critical threat actor. This address has demonstrated persistent, aggressive malicious behavior across multiple detection vectors.
The following attack categories were identified:
Our monitoring infrastructure has identified 162.212.153.56, geolocated to Chicago, United States, operating on the network of tzulo, inc., as a source of suspicious network activity. The address has been active for 60 days in our monitoring system, producing 221 flagged requests at a rate of ~3.7/day. Operating from datacenter infrastructure, this IP is typical of addresses used in organized attack operations. Cloud and VPS providers are commonly exploited as launching platforms for automated scanning. With 3 different attack patterns detected, this IP exhibits behavior characteristic of advanced automated scanning frameworks. Our records show 141 malicious IPs originating from United States, positioning it as a significant contributor to global threat activity. At 165/100, this is an extremely high-risk address. All traffic should be considered hostile.
This IP belongs to a hosting or data center provider. Malicious traffic from hosting infrastructure often originates from compromised VPS instances, rented servers used for scanning campaigns, or abused free-tier cloud accounts. Hosting providers typically respond to abuse reports within 24-72 hours.
Analyzing User-Agent strings reveals automated tools masquerading as legitimate browsers. Inconsistencies between claimed browser capabilities and actual behavior, impossible version combinations, and known scanner signatures help identify malicious clients.
Modern deception technology deploys fake credentials, decoy files, and breadcrumbs throughout production environments. When attackers interact with these deceptions, high-fidelity alerts trigger with virtually zero false positives.