
ABUSE.MOM — BEHAVE OR GET EXPOSED
| Signature | Description | Points | Severity |
|---|---|---|---|
| UA bot: curl | Known bot/crawler User-Agent detected | +40 | |
| Danger strong hits: 1 | High-risk paths: shells, RCE vectors, exploits | +25 |
Reconstructed HTTP requests from server access logs. Target domains redacted for security.
* Typical request patterns for detected signatures. Actual target domains are redacted.
Address UA spoofing from 162.158.182.34: maintain blocklist of known malicious UA strings, require consistent UA across sessions, implement TLS fingerprinting.
Other blocked IPs from the same /24 subnet — indicates systematic abuse from this network range.
This IP was checked against major DNS-based blacklists used by mail servers and firewalls worldwide.
Checked: Spamhaus, SpamCop, Barracuda, SORBS, CBL, UCEProtect. Results may change over time.
162.158.182.34 has been assigned a threat score of 65/100 (High). The IP is rated as a high-level threat. Network administrators should implement blocking rules and monitor for any connections from this address.
The following attack categories were identified:
Our monitoring infrastructure has identified 162.158.182.34, geolocated to Stockholm, Sweden, operating on the network of Cloudflare, Inc., as a source of suspicious network activity. Our sensors captured 1 malicious requests from this address across a 1-day span, reflecting a sustained attack cadence of ~1 requests per day. Classified as a hosting IP, this address likely runs on a rented server or cloud instance. Attackers prefer datacenter IPs for their high bandwidth and disposable nature. The IP exhibits User-Agent manipulation, switching between different browser identities or sending empty headers. Sweden currently accounts for 114 blocked IPs in our database, making it a significant source of malicious traffic. The score of 65/100 warrants active monitoring and rate-limiting. Full blocking is advisable for sensitive systems.
This IP belongs to a hosting or data center provider. Malicious traffic from hosting infrastructure often originates from compromised VPS instances, rented servers used for scanning campaigns, or abused free-tier cloud accounts. Hosting providers typically respond to abuse reports within 24-72 hours.
Examining HTTP headers beyond User-Agent reveals attack tools and automated scripts. Missing standard headers, unusual ordering, non-standard values, and inconsistencies with claimed client identity all serve as reliable detection signals.
SSH servers face constant brute force attacks targeting common usernames and weak passwords. Key-based authentication, fail2ban, non-standard ports, and IP allowlisting dramatically reduce the attack surface. Monitoring auth logs reveals active campaigns and compromised credentials.