
ABUSE.MOM — BEHAVE OR GET EXPOSED
| Signature | Description | Points | Severity |
|---|---|---|---|
| 404 ratio >= 60% | Majority of requests returned 404 — enumeration | +25 | |
| Burst 5/2s | Abnormally fast request rate — automated scanning | +35 |
Reconstructed HTTP requests from server access logs. Target domains redacted for security.
* Typical request patterns for detected signatures. Actual target domains are redacted.
Block scanning from 159.26.103.178: rate-limit 404 responses per IP, deploy a honeypot 404 page, ensure no backup files are web-accessible.
IP 159.26.103.178 is generating excessive traffic. Limit connections per source IP. Enable geographic blocking if traffic from this region is unexpected.
Other blocked IPs from the same /24 subnet — indicates systematic abuse from this network range.
This IP was checked against major DNS-based blacklists used by mail servers and firewalls worldwide.
Checked: Spamhaus, SpamCop, Barracuda, SORBS, CBL, UCEProtect. Results may change over time.
159.26.103.178 has been assigned a threat score of 60/100 (High). At this threat level, the IP is considered high risk. Firewall rules should be updated to deny traffic from this source.
The following attack categories were identified:
Network traffic from 159.26.103.178, located in Seattle, United States, operating on the network of Proton AG, has been classified as malicious by our automated threat scoring engine. The address has been active for 3 days in our monitoring system, producing 120 flagged requests at a rate of ~40/day. This IP is identified as a VPN or proxy endpoint, commonly used to mask the true origin of attack traffic and bypass geographic or reputation-based blocking. The dual attack vectors of Path Enumeration combined with Request Flooding indicate a coordinated assault rather than opportunistic scanning. United States currently accounts for 105 blocked IPs in our database, making it a significant source of malicious traffic. At 60/100, this IP presents a meaningful threat. Implement rate limiting with escalation to blocking.
This IP is associated with a VPN or proxy service. Attackers frequently route their traffic through anonymizing services to obscure their true location. This makes attribution more challenging but the malicious behavior patterns remain detectable.
Distributed denial of service attacks overwhelm infrastructure with traffic volume. Effective mitigation combines always-on traffic scrubbing, anycast network distribution, rate limiting, and the ability to quickly scale absorption capacity during attacks.
Effective rate limiting must balance protection against abuse with allowing legitimate traffic bursts. Sliding window algorithms, token buckets, and adaptive thresholds based on client reputation provide layered defense against flooding attacks.