
ABUSE.MOM — BEHAVE OR GET EXPOSED
| Signature | Description | Points | Severity |
|---|---|---|---|
| Danger strong hits: 1 | High-risk paths: shells, RCE vectors, exploits | +25 | |
| UA bot: python | Known bot/crawler User-Agent detected | +40 |
Reconstructed HTTP requests from server access logs. Target domains redacted for security.
* Typical request patterns for detected signatures. Actual target domains are redacted.
We have detected 27 malicious IPs from this autonomous system.
Address UA spoofing from 154.163.183.98: maintain blocklist of known malicious UA strings, require consistent UA across sessions, implement TLS fingerprinting.
This IP was checked against major DNS-based blacklists used by mail servers and firewalls worldwide.
Checked: Spamhaus, SpamCop, Barracuda, SORBS, CBL, UCEProtect. Results may change over time.
154.163.183.98 has been assigned a threat score of 65/100 (High). At this threat level, the IP is considered high risk. Firewall rules should be updated to deny traffic from this source.
The following attack categories were identified:
Threat intelligence analysis has linked 154.163.183.98 to malicious activity originating from Accra, GH, operating on the network of Scancom [MTNGhana] Mobile Subscribers. The address has been under observation since its initial detection. During its 6-day observation window, we recorded 97 hostile requests from this IP — roughly 16.2 per day on average. The address belongs to a mobile carrier network. The sustained pattern of malicious requests indicates either a compromised device or deliberate abuse. The IP exhibits User-Agent manipulation, switching between different browser identities or sending empty headers. Our records show 53 malicious IPs originating from GH, positioning it as a notable contributor to global threat activity. At 65/100, this IP presents a meaningful threat. Implement rate limiting with escalation to blocking.
Path traversal attacks attempt to access files outside the intended directory by manipulating file path references. Attackers use sequences like ../ to reach sensitive system files such as /etc/passwd or application configuration files.
Examining HTTP headers beyond User-Agent reveals attack tools and automated scripts. Missing standard headers, unusual ordering, non-standard values, and inconsistencies with claimed client identity all serve as reliable detection signals.