
ABUSE.MOM — BEHAVE OR GET EXPOSED
| Signature | Description | Points | Severity |
|---|---|---|---|
| 404 ratio >= 60% | Majority of requests returned 404 — enumeration | +25 | |
| Probe 302→404 | Behavioral anomaly detected by automated analysis | +20 | |
| UA changed | Multiple User-Agents — bot rotation technique | +25 |
Reconstructed HTTP requests from server access logs. Target domains redacted for security.
* Typical request patterns for detected signatures. Actual target domains are redacted.
Block scanning from 151.38.158.248: rate-limit 404 responses per IP, deploy a honeypot 404 page, ensure no backup files are web-accessible.
Address UA spoofing from 151.38.158.248: maintain blocklist of known malicious UA strings, require consistent UA across sessions, implement TLS fingerprinting.
This IP was checked against major DNS-based blacklists used by mail servers and firewalls worldwide.
Checked: Spamhaus, SpamCop, Barracuda, SORBS, CBL, UCEProtect. Results may change over time.
151.38.158.248 has been assigned a threat score of 70/100 (High). The IP is rated as a high-level threat. Network administrators should implement blocking rules and monitor for any connections from this address.
The following attack categories were identified:
IP address 151.38.158.248 has been traced to Villarboit, Italy, operating on the network of INFOSTRADA. Our threat detection systems have flagged this address based on observed malicious behavior patterns. The address has been active for 6 days in our monitoring system, producing 188 flagged requests at a rate of ~31.3/day. The address belongs to a mobile carrier network. The sustained pattern of malicious requests indicates either a compromised device or deliberate abuse. The dual attack vectors of Path Enumeration combined with User-Agent Anomaly indicate a coordinated assault rather than opportunistic scanning. Italy currently accounts for 106 blocked IPs in our database, making it a significant source of malicious traffic. The score of 70/100 indicates a confirmed malicious actor. Network-level blocking is appropriate.
TLS fingerprinting creates unique identifiers based on how clients negotiate encrypted connections. The JA3 and JA4 methods generate hashes from TLS ClientHello parameters, enabling identification of specific tools and malware regardless of IP address changes.
Containerized applications face unique security challenges including vulnerable base images, excessive privileges, shared kernel attacks, and insecure orchestration configurations. Runtime security monitoring and immutable container policies mitigate these risks.