
ABUSE.MOM — BEHAVE OR GET EXPOSED
| Signature | Description | Points | Severity |
|---|---|---|---|
| 404 ratio 40-60% | Majority of requests returned 404 — enumeration | +15 | |
| Foreign referer | Referer from unrelated external domain | +10 | |
| UA bot: Go-http-client | Known bot/crawler User-Agent detected | +40 |
Reconstructed HTTP requests from server access logs. Target domains redacted for security.
* Typical request patterns for detected signatures. Actual target domains are redacted.
Block scanning from 151.240.95.208: rate-limit 404 responses per IP, deploy a honeypot 404 page, ensure no backup files are web-accessible.
Address UA spoofing from 151.240.95.208: maintain blocklist of known malicious UA strings, require consistent UA across sessions, implement TLS fingerprinting.
This IP was checked against major DNS-based blacklists used by mail servers and firewalls worldwide.
Checked: Spamhaus, SpamCop, Barracuda, SORBS, CBL, UCEProtect. Results may change over time.
151.240.95.208 has been assigned a threat score of 65/100 (High). At this threat level, the IP is considered high risk. Firewall rules should be updated to deny traffic from this source.
The following attack categories were identified:
IP address 151.240.95.208 has been traced to Portland, United States, operating on the network of GSL Networks Pty LTD. Our threat detection systems have flagged this address based on observed malicious behavior patterns. The address has been active for 3 days in our monitoring system, producing 183 flagged requests at a rate of ~61/day. The address operates as a VPN/proxy exit node. Attackers route traffic through anonymizing services to obscure their real location and evade IP-based security controls. The dual attack vectors of Path Enumeration combined with User-Agent Anomaly indicate a coordinated assault rather than opportunistic scanning. At 65/100, this IP presents a meaningful threat. Implement rate limiting with escalation to blocking.
This IP is associated with a VPN or proxy service. Attackers frequently route their traffic through anonymizing services to obscure their true location. This makes attribution more challenging but the malicious behavior patterns remain detectable.
Analyzing User-Agent strings reveals automated tools masquerading as legitimate browsers. Inconsistencies between claimed browser capabilities and actual behavior, impossible version combinations, and known scanner signatures help identify malicious clients.
DNS sinkholing redirects queries for known malicious domains to controlled IP addresses. This technique blocks malware communication, prevents data exfiltration, and identifies compromised internal hosts attempting to contact command-and-control servers.