
ABUSE.MOM — BEHAVE OR GET EXPOSED
| Signature | Description | Points | Severity |
|---|---|---|---|
| Danger strong hits: 4 | High-risk paths: shells, RCE vectors, exploits | +100 | |
| Danger medium hits: 3 | Medium-risk: admin panels, config files | +30 | |
| Foreign referer seen | Referer from unrelated external domain | +10 | |
| Danger medium hits: 4 | Medium-risk: admin panels, config files | +40 | |
| 404 ratio 40-60% | Majority of requests returned 404 — enumeration | +15 | |
| Danger strong hits: 2 | High-risk paths: shells, RCE vectors, exploits | +50 | |
| 404 ratio >= 60% | Majority of requests returned 404 — enumeration | +25 | |
| Probe pattern 302->404 same path | Behavioral anomaly detected by automated analysis | +20 | |
| Danger strong hits: 1 | High-risk paths: shells, RCE vectors, exploits | +25 | |
| Danger strong hits: 8 | High-risk paths: shells, RCE vectors, exploits | +100 | |
| Danger medium hits: 6 | Medium-risk: admin panels, config files | +60 | |
| Danger medium hits: 2 | Medium-risk: admin panels, config files | +20 |
Reconstructed HTTP requests from server access logs. Target domains redacted for security.
* Typical request patterns for detected signatures. Actual target domains are redacted.
Block scanning from 15.235.83.135: rate-limit 404 responses per IP, deploy a honeypot 404 page, ensure no backup files are web-accessible.
Network reconnaissance data from Shodan. Open ports may indicate running services, misconfigurations, or potential attack surfaces.
| Port | Service | Risk | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| 22 | SSH | Low | Secure Shell — common brute force target for remote access |
| 79 | Unknown | Low | Service on port 79 |
| 80 | HTTP | Low | HTTP web server — standard web traffic |
| 111 | Unknown | Low | Service on port 111 |
| 135 | Unknown | Low | Service on port 135 |
| 137 | Unknown | Low | Service on port 137 |
| 443 | HTTPS | Low | HTTPS web server — encrypted web traffic |
| 445 | SMB | Critical | SMB file sharing — high-risk for EternalBlue and ransomware |
| 1801 | Unknown | Low | Service on port 1801 |
| 3389 | RDP | High | Remote Desktop Protocol — primary target for ransomware attacks |
| 9398 | Unknown | Low | Service on port 9398 |
| 9399 | Unknown | Low | Service on port 9399 |
⚠️ Network scanning reveals 2 dangerous services exposed on 15.235.83.135. Exposed RDP (3389) is the #1 entry point for ransomware attacks. SMB (445) exposure is associated with worm propagation and EternalBlue exploits. These services should not be publicly accessible without strict firewall rules.
Data source: Shodan InternetDB. Scanned independently of abuse.mom.
This IP was checked against major DNS-based blacklists used by mail servers and firewalls worldwide.
Checked: Spamhaus, SpamCop, Barracuda, SORBS, CBL, UCEProtect. Results may change over time.
15.235.83.135 has been assigned a threat score of 185/100 (Critical). This is a critical-level threat. Systems administrators should treat this IP as hostile and block all inbound connections without exception.
The following attack categories were identified:
15.235.83.135 is registered in Montreal, Canada, operating on the network of OVH SAS. This IP first appeared in our threat feeds after triggering multiple behavioral detection signatures. The address has been active for 62 days in our monitoring system, producing 28 flagged requests at a rate of ~0.5/day. Operating from datacenter infrastructure, this IP is typical of addresses used in organized attack operations. Cloud and VPS providers are commonly exploited as launching platforms for automated scanning. The IP exhibits directory enumeration behavior, systematically requesting non-existent paths to discover hidden files and misconfigured resources. Our records show 191 malicious IPs originating from Canada, positioning it as a significant contributor to global threat activity. With a threat score of 185/100, this IP is among the most dangerous addresses in our database. Immediate and complete blocking is strongly recommended.
This IP belongs to a hosting or data center provider. Malicious traffic from hosting infrastructure often originates from compromised VPS instances, rented servers used for scanning campaigns, or abused free-tier cloud accounts. Hosting providers typically respond to abuse reports within 24-72 hours.
Request smuggling exploits differences in how front-end and back-end servers parse HTTP requests. This technique can bypass security controls, poison web caches, and hijack other users sessions by desynchronizing request boundaries.
MFA dramatically reduces the effectiveness of credential-based attacks. Even when passwords are compromised through phishing or data breaches, the additional authentication factor prevents unauthorized access in the vast majority of cases.