
ABUSE.MOM — BEHAVE OR GET EXPOSED
| Signature | Description | Points | Severity |
|---|---|---|---|
| UA bot: wget | Known bot/crawler User-Agent detected | +40 | |
| Danger strong hits: 1 | High-risk paths: shells, RCE vectors, exploits | +25 |
Reconstructed HTTP requests from server access logs. Target domains redacted for security.
* Typical request patterns for detected signatures. Actual target domains are redacted.
Address UA spoofing from 147.182.206.113: maintain blocklist of known malicious UA strings, require consistent UA across sessions, implement TLS fingerprinting.
This IP was checked against major DNS-based blacklists used by mail servers and firewalls worldwide.
Checked: Spamhaus, SpamCop, Barracuda, SORBS, CBL, UCEProtect. Results may change over time.
147.182.206.113 has been assigned a threat score of 65/100 (High). At this threat level, the IP is considered high risk. Firewall rules should be updated to deny traffic from this source.
The following attack categories were identified:
Our monitoring infrastructure has identified 147.182.206.113, geolocated to Santa Clara, United States, operating on the network of DigitalOcean, LLC, as a source of suspicious network activity. Our sensors captured 1 malicious requests from this address across a 1-day span, reflecting a sustained attack cadence of ~1 requests per day. This address belongs to a datacenter or cloud hosting provider. Hosting IPs are frequently leveraged by threat actors who rent cheap VPS instances specifically for conducting attacks. The IP exhibits User-Agent manipulation, switching between different browser identities or sending empty headers. Our records show 128 malicious IPs originating from United States, positioning it as a significant contributor to global threat activity. The score of 65/100 warrants active monitoring and rate-limiting. Full blocking is advisable for sensitive systems.
This IP belongs to a hosting or data center provider. Malicious traffic from hosting infrastructure often originates from compromised VPS instances, rented servers used for scanning campaigns, or abused free-tier cloud accounts. Hosting providers typically respond to abuse reports within 24-72 hours.
TLS fingerprinting creates unique identifiers based on how clients negotiate encrypted connections. The JA3 and JA4 methods generate hashes from TLS ClientHello parameters, enabling identification of specific tools and malware regardless of IP address changes.
Signature-based detection matches known attack patterns but misses novel threats. Behavioral analysis identifies anomalies in request patterns, timing, and volume, catching zero-day attacks that signatures cannot recognize.