
ABUSE.MOM — BEHAVE OR GET EXPOSED
| Signature | Description | Points | Severity |
|---|---|---|---|
| UA changed for same IP | Multiple User-Agents — bot rotation technique | +25 | |
| Danger strong hits: 1 | High-risk paths: shells, RCE vectors, exploits | +25 | |
| Danger medium hits: 1 | Medium-risk: admin panels, config files | +10 | |
| 404 ratio >= 60% | Majority of requests returned 404 — enumeration | +25 |
Reconstructed HTTP requests from server access logs. Target domains redacted for security.
* Typical request patterns for detected signatures. Actual target domains are redacted.
Address UA spoofing from 143.198.202.220: maintain blocklist of known malicious UA strings, require consistent UA across sessions, implement TLS fingerprinting.
Block scanning from 143.198.202.220: rate-limit 404 responses per IP, deploy a honeypot 404 page, ensure no backup files are web-accessible.
Other blocked IPs from the same /24 subnet — indicates systematic abuse from this network range.
Network reconnaissance data from Shodan. Open ports may indicate running services, misconfigurations, or potential attack surfaces.
| Port | Service | Risk | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| 22 | SSH | Low | Secure Shell — common brute force target for remote access |
| 80 | HTTP | Low | HTTP web server — standard web traffic |
| CVE ID | Link |
|---|---|
| CVE-2013-2765 | NVD → |
| CVE-2012-4001 | NVD → |
| CVE-2007-4723 | NVD → |
| CVE-2025-55753 | NVD → |
| CVE-2025-65082 | NVD → |
| CVE-2025-66200 | NVD → |
| CVE-2025-49812 | NVD → |
| CVE-2013-0942 | NVD → |
| CVE-2024-47252 | NVD → |
| CVE-2025-58098 | NVD → |
| CVE-2013-4365 | NVD → |
| CVE-2025-59775 | NVD → |
| CVE-2024-43394 | NVD → |
| CVE-2009-2299 | NVD → |
| CVE-2011-2688 | NVD → |
| CVE-2024-43204 | NVD → |
| CVE-2024-42516 | NVD → |
| CVE-2025-49630 | NVD → |
| CVE-2025-53020 | NVD → |
| CVE-2012-3526 | NVD → |
| CVE-2011-1176 | NVD → |
| CVE-2025-23048 | NVD → |
| CVE-2013-0941 | NVD → |
| CVE-2012-4360 | NVD → |
| CVE-2009-0796 | NVD → |
🔴 This host has 25 known CVEs associated with its exposed services. This volume strongly suggests severely outdated software. Review each CVE in the NVD database.
Data source: Shodan InternetDB. Scanned independently of abuse.mom.
This IP was checked against major DNS-based blacklists used by mail servers and firewalls worldwide.
Checked: Spamhaus, SpamCop, Barracuda, SORBS, CBL, UCEProtect. Results may change over time.
143.198.202.220 has been assigned a threat score of 85/100 (Critical). This represents a critical risk level. Our detection systems have flagged multiple high-confidence indicators of malicious intent from this address.
The following attack categories were identified:
The address 143.198.202.220 originates from Singapore, Singapore, operating on the network of DigitalOcean, LLC. It was identified through automated analysis of incoming network traffic across monitored endpoints. The address has been active for 1 days in our monitoring system, producing 2 flagged requests at a rate of ~2/day. This address belongs to a datacenter or cloud hosting provider. Hosting IPs are frequently leveraged by threat actors who rent cheap VPS instances specifically for conducting attacks. The dual attack vectors of User-Agent Anomaly combined with Path Enumeration indicate a coordinated assault rather than opportunistic scanning. Our records show 141 malicious IPs originating from Singapore, positioning it as a significant contributor to global threat activity. The score of 85/100 indicates a confirmed malicious actor. Network-level blocking is appropriate.
This IP belongs to a hosting or data center provider. Malicious traffic from hosting infrastructure often originates from compromised VPS instances, rented servers used for scanning campaigns, or abused free-tier cloud accounts. Hosting providers typically respond to abuse reports within 24-72 hours.
Analyzing User-Agent strings reveals automated tools masquerading as legitimate browsers. Inconsistencies between claimed browser capabilities and actual behavior, impossible version combinations, and known scanner signatures help identify malicious clients.
Race conditions occur when application behavior depends on the timing of concurrent operations. Attackers exploit these timing windows to bypass limits, duplicate transactions, or escalate privileges by sending carefully timed parallel requests.