
ABUSE.MOM — BEHAVE OR GET EXPOSED
| Signature | Description | Points | Severity |
|---|---|---|---|
| Danger medium hits: 2 | Medium-risk: admin panels, config files | +20 | |
| Danger strong hits: 2 | High-risk paths: shells, RCE vectors, exploits | +50 | |
| UA suspicious | Behavioral anomaly detected by automated analysis | +15 |
Reconstructed HTTP requests from server access logs. Target domains redacted for security.
* Typical request patterns for detected signatures. Actual target domains are redacted.
IP 142.93.33.157 shows suspicious UA behavior. Block empty User-Agent requests. Implement JavaScript-based bot detection for sensitive endpoints.
This IP was checked against major DNS-based blacklists used by mail servers and firewalls worldwide.
Checked: Spamhaus, SpamCop, Barracuda, SORBS, CBL, UCEProtect. Results may change over time.
142.93.33.157 has been assigned a threat score of 85/100 (Critical). With this rating, the IP falls into the critical severity bracket — among the most dangerous addresses in our monitoring database.
The following attack categories were identified:
IP address 142.93.33.157 has been traced to Slough, United Kingdom, operating on the network of DigitalOcean, LLC. Our threat detection systems have flagged this address based on observed malicious behavior patterns. Our sensors captured 216 malicious requests from this address across a 6-day span, reflecting a sustained attack cadence of ~36 requests per day. This address belongs to a datacenter or cloud hosting provider. Hosting IPs are frequently leveraged by threat actors who rent cheap VPS instances specifically for conducting attacks. Detected suspicious User-Agent anomalies including empty, forged, or rapidly rotating UA strings — characteristic of automated scanning tools. At 85/100, this IP warrants immediate defensive action.
This IP belongs to a hosting or data center provider. Malicious traffic from hosting infrastructure often originates from compromised VPS instances, rented servers used for scanning campaigns, or abused free-tier cloud accounts. Hosting providers typically respond to abuse reports within 24-72 hours.
SSRF attacks trick servers into making requests to internal resources that should not be publicly accessible. This can expose cloud metadata endpoints, internal APIs, and private network services, potentially leading to full infrastructure compromise.
Request smuggling exploits differences in how front-end and back-end servers parse HTTP requests. This technique can bypass security controls, poison web caches, and hijack other users sessions by desynchronizing request boundaries.