
ABUSE.MOM — BEHAVE OR GET EXPOSED
| Signature | Description | Points | Severity |
|---|---|---|---|
| 404 ratio >= 60% | Majority of requests returned 404 — enumeration | +25 | |
| Danger medium hits: 12 | Medium-risk: admin panels, config files | +60 | |
| Danger medium hits: 15 | Medium-risk: admin panels, config files | +60 | |
| Danger medium hits: 18 | Medium-risk: admin panels, config files | +60 | |
| Danger medium hits: 21 | Medium-risk: admin panels, config files | +60 | |
| Danger medium hits: 24 | Medium-risk: admin panels, config files | +60 | |
| Danger medium hits: 27 | Medium-risk: admin panels, config files | +60 | |
| Danger medium hits: 3 | Medium-risk: admin panels, config files | +30 | |
| Danger medium hits: 30 | Medium-risk: admin panels, config files | +60 | |
| Danger medium hits: 33 | Medium-risk: admin panels, config files | +60 | |
| Danger medium hits: 36 | Medium-risk: admin panels, config files | +60 | |
| Danger medium hits: 45 | Medium-risk: admin panels, config files | +60 | |
| Danger medium hits: 48 | Medium-risk: admin panels, config files | +60 | |
| Danger medium hits: 51 | Medium-risk: admin panels, config files | +60 | |
| Danger medium hits: 54 | Medium-risk: admin panels, config files | +60 | |
| Danger medium hits: 57 | Medium-risk: admin panels, config files | +60 | |
| Danger medium hits: 6 | Medium-risk: admin panels, config files | +60 | |
| Danger medium hits: 9 | Medium-risk: admin panels, config files | +60 | |
| Foreign referer | Referer from unrelated external domain | +10 | |
| Probe 302→404 | Behavioral anomaly detected by automated analysis | +20 | |
| UA changed | Multiple User-Agents — bot rotation technique | +25 |
Reconstructed HTTP requests from server access logs. Target domains redacted for security.
* Typical request patterns for detected signatures. Actual target domains are redacted.
Block scanning from 138.229.96.95: rate-limit 404 responses per IP, deploy a honeypot 404 page, ensure no backup files are web-accessible.
IP 138.229.96.95 shows suspicious UA behavior. Block empty User-Agent requests. Implement JavaScript-based bot detection for sensitive endpoints.
Other blocked IPs from the same /24 subnet — indicates systematic abuse from this network range.
This IP was checked against major DNS-based blacklists used by mail servers and firewalls worldwide.
Checked: Spamhaus, SpamCop, Barracuda, SORBS, CBL, UCEProtect. Results may change over time.
138.229.96.95 has been assigned a threat score of 140/100 (Critical). A score this high marks a critical threat actor. This address has demonstrated persistent, aggressive malicious behavior across multiple detection vectors.
The following attack categories were identified:
Threat intelligence analysis has linked 138.229.96.95 to malicious activity originating from Buffalo, United States, operating on the network of Emeigh Investments LLC. The address has been under observation since its initial detection. Our sensors captured 909 malicious requests from this address across a 23-day span, reflecting a sustained attack cadence of ~39.5 requests per day. The address operates as a VPN/proxy exit node. Attackers route traffic through anonymizing services to obscure their real location and evade IP-based security controls. Two attack patterns were identified (Path Enumeration and User-Agent Anomaly), suggesting a semi-automated campaign that targets multiple vulnerabilities. United States currently accounts for 160 blocked IPs in our database, making it a significant source of malicious traffic. With a threat score of 140/100, this IP is among the most dangerous addresses in our database. Immediate and complete blocking is strongly recommended.
This IP is associated with a VPN or proxy service. Attackers frequently route their traffic through anonymizing services to obscure their true location. This makes attribution more challenging but the malicious behavior patterns remain detectable.
Credential stuffing uses stolen username-password pairs from data breaches to attempt logins across many websites. Since users frequently reuse passwords, these automated attacks achieve success rates of 0.1-2%, which translates to thousands of compromised accounts from millions of attempts.
Race conditions occur when application behavior depends on the timing of concurrent operations. Attackers exploit these timing windows to bypass limits, duplicate transactions, or escalate privileges by sending carefully timed parallel requests.