
ABUSE.MOM — BEHAVE OR GET EXPOSED
| Signature | Description | Points | Severity |
|---|---|---|---|
| UA suspicious (short/empty) | Behavioral anomaly detected by automated analysis | +15 | |
| Danger strong hits: 2 | High-risk paths: shells, RCE vectors, exploits | +50 | |
| Danger medium hits: 2 | Medium-risk: admin panels, config files | +20 |
Reconstructed HTTP requests from server access logs. Target domains redacted for security.
* Typical request patterns for detected signatures. Actual target domains are redacted.
IP 138.197.137.73 shows suspicious UA behavior. Block empty User-Agent requests. Implement JavaScript-based bot detection for sensitive endpoints.
This IP was checked against major DNS-based blacklists used by mail servers and firewalls worldwide.
Checked: Spamhaus, SpamCop, Barracuda, SORBS, CBL, UCEProtect. Results may change over time.
138.197.137.73 has been assigned a threat score of 85/100 (Critical). This represents a critical risk level. Our detection systems have flagged multiple high-confidence indicators of malicious intent from this address.
The following attack categories were identified:
The address 138.197.137.73 originates from Toronto, Canada, operating on the network of DigitalOcean, LLC. It was identified through automated analysis of incoming network traffic across monitored endpoints. During its 1-day observation window, we recorded 1 hostile requests from this IP — roughly 1 per day on average. The IP is classified as hosting/datacenter infrastructure, commonly associated with rented servers used for automated attack campaigns, botnet command-and-control, or vulnerability scanning at scale. Detected suspicious User-Agent anomalies including empty, forged, or rapidly rotating UA strings — characteristic of automated scanning tools. Canada currently accounts for 107 blocked IPs in our database, making it a significant source of malicious traffic. A threat score of 85/100 places this IP in the high-risk category. Blocking at the firewall level is recommended.
This IP belongs to a hosting or data center provider. Malicious traffic from hosting infrastructure often originates from compromised VPS instances, rented servers used for scanning campaigns, or abused free-tier cloud accounts. Hosting providers typically respond to abuse reports within 24-72 hours.
Examining HTTP headers beyond User-Agent reveals attack tools and automated scripts. Missing standard headers, unusual ordering, non-standard values, and inconsistencies with claimed client identity all serve as reliable detection signals.
Expired, self-signed, or misconfigured TLS certificates create security vulnerabilities and trust issues. Certificate monitoring, automated renewal through ACME protocols, and proper certificate chain configuration prevent both security gaps and service disruptions.