
ABUSE.MOM — BEHAVE OR GET EXPOSED
| Signature | Description | Points | Severity |
|---|---|---|---|
| Danger strong hits: 3 | High-risk paths: shells, RCE vectors, exploits | +75 | |
| Danger medium hits: 2 | Medium-risk: admin panels, config files | +20 | |
| POST requests present | Behavioral anomaly detected by automated analysis | +8 |
Reconstructed HTTP requests from server access logs. Target domains redacted for security.
* Typical request patterns for detected signatures. Actual target domains are redacted.
Add 138.128.140.81 to your firewall blocklist. Review logs for successful connections. Enable comprehensive logging on all public-facing services.
Other blocked IPs from the same /24 subnet — indicates systematic abuse from this network range.
This IP was checked against major DNS-based blacklists used by mail servers and firewalls worldwide.
Checked: Spamhaus, SpamCop, Barracuda, SORBS, CBL, UCEProtect. Results may change over time.
138.128.140.81 has been assigned a threat score of 103/100 (Critical). This places it in the critical threat category. Immediate blocking is strongly advised across all network perimeters.
The address 138.128.140.81 originates from Elk Grove Village, United States, operating on the network of i3D.net B.V. It was identified through automated analysis of incoming network traffic across monitored endpoints. During its 1-day observation window, we recorded 1 hostile requests from this IP — roughly 1 per day on average. This residential IP is likely a compromised consumer device. Home routers and IoT equipment with default credentials are prime targets for botnet operators. Our records show 106 malicious IPs originating from United States, positioning it as a significant contributor to global threat activity. At 103/100, this is an extremely high-risk address. All traffic should be considered hostile.
This IP is classified as residential, suggesting it may belong to a compromised home device, IoT botnet member, or an infected personal computer. Residential IPs involved in attacks often indicate malware infection without the owner's knowledge.
Request smuggling exploits differences in how front-end and back-end servers parse HTTP requests. This technique can bypass security controls, poison web caches, and hijack other users sessions by desynchronizing request boundaries.
Automated response systems can block threats in milliseconds, far faster than human analysts. However, automation requires careful safeguards — rate limits on blocking actions, automatic expiration, and human review queues prevent automated systems from causing self-inflicted outages.