
ABUSE.MOM — BEHAVE OR GET EXPOSED
| Signature | Description | Points | Severity |
|---|---|---|---|
| UA suspicious (short/empty) | Behavioral anomaly detected by automated analysis | +15 | |
| Danger strong hits: 6 | High-risk paths: shells, RCE vectors, exploits | +100 | |
| Danger medium hits: 332 | Medium-risk: admin panels, config files | +60 | |
| Burst: 93 req / 2s | Abnormally fast request rate — automated scanning | +35 | |
| Burst: 200 req / 10s | Abnormally fast request rate — automated scanning | +35 | |
| Danger strong hits: 2 | High-risk paths: shells, RCE vectors, exploits | +50 | |
| Danger medium hits: 166 | Medium-risk: admin panels, config files | +60 | |
| 404 ratio 40-60% | Majority of requests returned 404 — enumeration | +15 | |
| Probe pattern 302->404 same path | Behavioral anomaly detected by automated analysis | +20 | |
| Burst: 51 req / 2s | Abnormally fast request rate — automated scanning | +35 | |
| Burst: 150 req / 10s | Abnormally fast request rate — automated scanning | +35 | |
| Danger strong hits: 3 | High-risk paths: shells, RCE vectors, exploits | +75 | |
| Burst: 49 req / 2s | Abnormally fast request rate — automated scanning | +35 | |
| Burst: 158 req / 10s | Abnormally fast request rate — automated scanning | +35 | |
| Burst: 63 req / 2s | Abnormally fast request rate — automated scanning | +35 | |
| Burst: 59 req / 2s | Abnormally fast request rate — automated scanning | +35 | |
| Burst: 195 req / 10s | Abnormally fast request rate — automated scanning | +35 | |
| Danger medium hits: 16 | Medium-risk: admin panels, config files | +60 | |
| Burst: 16 req / 2s | Abnormally fast request rate — automated scanning | +35 | |
| Burst: 16 req / 10s | Abnormally fast request rate — automated scanning | +35 | |
| Burst: 55 req / 2s | Abnormally fast request rate — automated scanning | +35 | |
| Burst: 149 req / 10s | Abnormally fast request rate — automated scanning | +35 | |
| Burst: 43 req / 2s | Abnormally fast request rate — automated scanning | +35 | |
| Burst: 128 req / 10s | Abnormally fast request rate — automated scanning | +35 |
Reconstructed HTTP requests from server access logs. Target domains redacted for security.
* Typical request patterns for detected signatures. Actual target domains are redacted.
Address UA spoofing from 135.225.39.191: maintain blocklist of known malicious UA strings, require consistent UA across sessions, implement TLS fingerprinting.
Implement limit_req_zone in nginx. Deploy CDN with DDoS protection. Configure SYN cookies and connection tracking to throttle 135.225.39.191.
Block scanning from 135.225.39.191: rate-limit 404 responses per IP, deploy a honeypot 404 page, ensure no backup files are web-accessible.
This IP was checked against major DNS-based blacklists used by mail servers and firewalls worldwide.
Checked: Spamhaus, SpamCop, Barracuda, SORBS, CBL, UCEProtect. Results may change over time.
135.225.39.191 has been assigned a threat score of 245/100 (Critical). This is a critical-level threat. Systems administrators should treat this IP as hostile and block all inbound connections without exception.
The following attack categories were identified:
The address 135.225.39.191 originates from Gävle, Sweden, operating on the network of Microsoft Corporation. It was identified through automated analysis of incoming network traffic across monitored endpoints. Our sensors captured 8 malicious requests from this address across a 1-day span, reflecting a sustained attack cadence of ~8 requests per day. The IP is classified as hosting/datacenter infrastructure, commonly associated with rented servers used for automated attack campaigns, botnet command-and-control, or vulnerability scanning at scale. The combination of 3 distinct attack vectors indicates a sophisticated, multi-pronged threat actor deploying automated tools that probe multiple attack surfaces simultaneously. With 101 flagged addresses, Sweden represents a significant presence in our threat database. At 245/100, this is an extremely high-risk address. All traffic should be considered hostile.
This IP belongs to a hosting or data center provider. Malicious traffic from hosting infrastructure often originates from compromised VPS instances, rented servers used for scanning campaigns, or abused free-tier cloud accounts. Hosting providers typically respond to abuse reports within 24-72 hours.
Examining HTTP headers beyond User-Agent reveals attack tools and automated scripts. Missing standard headers, unusual ordering, non-standard values, and inconsistencies with claimed client identity all serve as reliable detection signals.
Deepfake audio and video enable convincing impersonation of executives and trusted individuals. Real-time voice cloning has been used in successful fraud campaigns, adding a new dimension to social engineering that traditional security training does not address.