
ABUSE.MOM — BEHAVE OR GET EXPOSED
| Signature | Description | Points | Severity |
|---|---|---|---|
| Danger medium hits: 11 | Medium-risk: admin panels, config files | +60 | |
| Danger strong hits: 10 | High-risk paths: shells, RCE vectors, exploits | +100 | |
| UA bot: Go-http-client | Known bot/crawler User-Agent detected | +40 |
Reconstructed HTTP requests from server access logs. Target domains redacted for security.
* Typical request patterns for detected signatures. Actual target domains are redacted.
Address UA spoofing from 135.136.41.171: maintain blocklist of known malicious UA strings, require consistent UA across sessions, implement TLS fingerprinting.
Other blocked IPs from the same /24 subnet — indicates systematic abuse from this network range.
This IP was checked against major DNS-based blacklists used by mail servers and firewalls worldwide.
Checked: Spamhaus, SpamCop, Barracuda, SORBS, CBL, UCEProtect. Results may change over time.
135.136.41.171 has been assigned a threat score of 200/100 (Critical). This is a critical-level threat. Systems administrators should treat this IP as hostile and block all inbound connections without exception.
The following attack categories were identified:
IP address 135.136.41.171 has been traced to Nuuk, GL, operating on the network of M247 Europe SRL. Our threat detection systems have flagged this address based on observed malicious behavior patterns. The address has been active for 1 days in our monitoring system, producing 39 flagged requests at a rate of ~39/day. This address belongs to a datacenter or cloud hosting provider. Hosting IPs are frequently leveraged by threat actors who rent cheap VPS instances specifically for conducting attacks. The IP exhibits User-Agent manipulation, switching between different browser identities or sending empty headers. A score of 200/100 places this address in the top tier of severity. Block and investigate any historical connections.
This IP belongs to a hosting or data center provider. Malicious traffic from hosting infrastructure often originates from compromised VPS instances, rented servers used for scanning campaigns, or abused free-tier cloud accounts. Hosting providers typically respond to abuse reports within 24-72 hours.
Request smuggling exploits differences in how front-end and back-end servers parse HTTP requests. This technique can bypass security controls, poison web caches, and hijack other users sessions by desynchronizing request boundaries.
WebSocket connections bypass traditional HTTP security controls, creating opportunities for cross-site WebSocket hijacking, denial of service, and data injection. Proper origin validation, authentication, and message rate limiting are essential for secure WebSocket implementations.