
ABUSE.MOM — BEHAVE OR GET EXPOSED
| Signature | Description | Points | Severity |
|---|---|---|---|
| UA suspicious (short/empty) | Behavioral anomaly detected by automated analysis | +15 | |
| Danger strong hits: 6 | High-risk paths: shells, RCE vectors, exploits | +100 | |
| Danger medium hits: 516 | Medium-risk: admin panels, config files | +60 | |
| Burst: 60 req / 2s | Abnormally fast request rate — automated scanning | +35 | |
| Burst: 193 req / 10s | Abnormally fast request rate — automated scanning | +35 | |
| Danger strong hits: 4 | High-risk paths: shells, RCE vectors, exploits | +100 | |
| Danger medium hits: 387 | Medium-risk: admin panels, config files | +60 | |
| Burst: 66 req / 2s | Abnormally fast request rate — automated scanning | +35 | |
| Burst: 200 req / 10s | Abnormally fast request rate — automated scanning | +35 | |
| Danger strong hits: 3 | High-risk paths: shells, RCE vectors, exploits | +75 | |
| Danger medium hits: 258 | Medium-risk: admin panels, config files | +60 | |
| Burst: 34 req / 2s | Abnormally fast request rate — automated scanning | +35 | |
| Burst: 116 req / 10s | Abnormally fast request rate — automated scanning | +35 | |
| Burst: 55 req / 2s | Abnormally fast request rate — automated scanning | +35 | |
| Burst: 196 req / 10s | Abnormally fast request rate — automated scanning | +35 | |
| Burst: 64 req / 2s | Abnormally fast request rate — automated scanning | +35 | |
| Danger strong hits: 2 | High-risk paths: shells, RCE vectors, exploits | +50 | |
| 404 ratio 40-60% | Majority of requests returned 404 — enumeration | +15 | |
| Probe pattern 302->404 same path | Behavioral anomaly detected by automated analysis | +20 | |
| Burst: 59 req / 2s | Abnormally fast request rate — automated scanning | +35 | |
| Burst: 185 req / 10s | Abnormally fast request rate — automated scanning | +35 | |
| Burst: 53 req / 2s | Abnormally fast request rate — automated scanning | +35 | |
| Burst: 165 req / 10s | Abnormally fast request rate — automated scanning | +35 | |
| Burst: 63 req / 2s | Abnormally fast request rate — automated scanning | +35 | |
| Burst: 49 req / 2s | Abnormally fast request rate — automated scanning | +35 | |
| Burst: 156 req / 10s | Abnormally fast request rate — automated scanning | +35 | |
| Burst: 44 req / 2s | Abnormally fast request rate — automated scanning | +35 | |
| Burst: 140 req / 10s | Abnormally fast request rate — automated scanning | +35 | |
| Burst: 158 req / 10s | Abnormally fast request rate — automated scanning | +35 | |
| Danger medium hits: 257 | Medium-risk: admin panels, config files | +60 | |
| Burst: 41 req / 2s | Abnormally fast request rate — automated scanning | +35 | |
| Burst: 132 req / 10s | Abnormally fast request rate — automated scanning | +35 | |
| Danger medium hits: 256 | Medium-risk: admin panels, config files | +60 | |
| Burst: 35 req / 2s | Abnormally fast request rate — automated scanning | +35 | |
| Burst: 114 req / 10s | Abnormally fast request rate — automated scanning | +35 | |
| Burst: 43 req / 2s | Abnormally fast request rate — automated scanning | +35 | |
| Burst: 127 req / 10s | Abnormally fast request rate — automated scanning | +35 | |
| Burst: 123 req / 10s | Abnormally fast request rate — automated scanning | +35 | |
| Burst: 68 req / 2s | Abnormally fast request rate — automated scanning | +35 | |
| Burst: 40 req / 2s | Abnormally fast request rate — automated scanning | +35 | |
| Burst: 115 req / 10s | Abnormally fast request rate — automated scanning | +35 | |
| Burst: 65 req / 2s | Abnormally fast request rate — automated scanning | +35 | |
| Burst: 61 req / 2s | Abnormally fast request rate — automated scanning | +35 | |
| Burst: 71 req / 2s | Abnormally fast request rate — automated scanning | +35 |
Reconstructed HTTP requests from server access logs. Target domains redacted for security.
* Typical request patterns for detected signatures. Actual target domains are redacted.
IP 135.116.194.58 shows suspicious UA behavior. Block empty User-Agent requests. Implement JavaScript-based bot detection for sensitive endpoints.
Implement limit_req_zone in nginx. Deploy CDN with DDoS protection. Configure SYN cookies and connection tracking to throttle 135.116.194.58.
Block scanning from 135.116.194.58: rate-limit 404 responses per IP, deploy a honeypot 404 page, ensure no backup files are web-accessible.
This IP was checked against major DNS-based blacklists used by mail servers and firewalls worldwide.
Checked: Spamhaus, SpamCop, Barracuda, SORBS, CBL, UCEProtect. Results may change over time.
135.116.194.58 has been assigned a threat score of 245/100 (Critical). This represents a critical risk level. Our detection systems have flagged multiple high-confidence indicators of malicious intent from this address.
The following attack categories were identified:
Threat intelligence analysis has linked 135.116.194.58 to malicious activity originating from Gävle, Sweden, operating on the network of MICROSOFT. The address has been under observation since its initial detection. The address has been active for 1 days in our monitoring system, producing 21 flagged requests at a rate of ~21/day. Operating from datacenter infrastructure, this IP is typical of addresses used in organized attack operations. Cloud and VPS providers are commonly exploited as launching platforms for automated scanning. The diversity of 3 separate attack methods suggests a comprehensive attack toolkit — likely an automated scanner that tests for vulnerabilities across multiple categories. Sweden currently accounts for 102 blocked IPs in our database, making it a significant source of malicious traffic. With a threat score of 245/100, this IP is among the most dangerous addresses in our database. Immediate and complete blocking is strongly recommended.
This IP belongs to a hosting or data center provider. Malicious traffic from hosting infrastructure often originates from compromised VPS instances, rented servers used for scanning campaigns, or abused free-tier cloud accounts. Hosting providers typically respond to abuse reports within 24-72 hours.
TLS fingerprinting creates unique identifiers based on how clients negotiate encrypted connections. The JA3 and JA4 methods generate hashes from TLS ClientHello parameters, enabling identification of specific tools and malware regardless of IP address changes.
DNS amplification exploits open resolvers to reflect and amplify traffic toward victims. A small query triggers a large response directed at the spoofed source IP, achieving amplification factors of 50x or more, overwhelming target bandwidth.