
ABUSE.MOM — BEHAVE OR GET EXPOSED
| Signature | Description | Points | Severity |
|---|---|---|---|
| Burst 13/2s | Abnormally fast request rate — automated scanning | +35 | |
| Burst 27/10s | Abnormally fast request rate — automated scanning | +35 | |
| Danger medium hits: 1 | Medium-risk: admin panels, config files | +10 | |
| POST seen | Behavioral anomaly detected by automated analysis | +8 |
Reconstructed HTTP requests from server access logs. Target domains redacted for security.
* Typical request patterns for detected signatures. Actual target domains are redacted.
Implement limit_req_zone in nginx. Deploy CDN with DDoS protection. Configure SYN cookies and connection tracking to throttle 130.49.11.175.
Other blocked IPs from the same /24 subnet — indicates systematic abuse from this network range.
This IP was checked against major DNS-based blacklists used by mail servers and firewalls worldwide.
Checked: Spamhaus, SpamCop, Barracuda, SORBS, CBL, UCEProtect. Results may change over time.
130.49.11.175 has been assigned a threat score of 88/100 (Critical). This places it in the critical threat category. Immediate blocking is strongly advised across all network perimeters.
The following attack categories were identified:
130.49.11.175 is registered in Safranbolu, Turkey, operating on the network of Alex Largman. This IP first appeared in our threat feeds after triggering multiple behavioral detection signatures. The address has been active for 2 days in our monitoring system, producing 53 flagged requests at a rate of ~26.5/day. The address operates as a VPN/proxy exit node. Attackers route traffic through anonymizing services to obscure their real location and evade IP-based security controls. Rate-based attacks from this IP aim to overwhelm server resources through high-volume request flooding. Our records show 555 malicious IPs originating from Turkey, positioning it as a major contributor to global threat activity. At 88/100, this IP warrants immediate defensive action.
This IP is associated with a VPN or proxy service. Attackers frequently route their traffic through anonymizing services to obscure their true location. This makes attribution more challenging but the malicious behavior patterns remain detectable.
Distributed denial of service attacks overwhelm infrastructure with traffic volume. Effective mitigation combines always-on traffic scrubbing, anycast network distribution, rate limiting, and the ability to quickly scale absorption capacity during attacks.
Request smuggling exploits differences in how front-end and back-end servers parse HTTP requests. This technique can bypass security controls, poison web caches, and hijack other users sessions by desynchronizing request boundaries.