
ABUSE.MOM — BEHAVE OR GET EXPOSED
| Signature | Description | Points | Severity |
|---|---|---|---|
| 404 ratio 40-60% | Majority of requests returned 404 — enumeration | +15 | |
| Foreign referer | Referer from unrelated external domain | +10 | |
| Probe 302→404 | Behavioral anomaly detected by automated analysis | +20 | |
| UA changed | Multiple User-Agents — bot rotation technique | +25 |
Reconstructed HTTP requests from server access logs. Target domains redacted for security.
* Typical request patterns for detected signatures. Actual target domains are redacted.
Block scanning from 128.14.239.38: rate-limit 404 responses per IP, deploy a honeypot 404 page, ensure no backup files are web-accessible.
Address UA spoofing from 128.14.239.38: maintain blocklist of known malicious UA strings, require consistent UA across sessions, implement TLS fingerprinting.
This IP was checked against major DNS-based blacklists used by mail servers and firewalls worldwide.
Checked: Spamhaus, SpamCop, Barracuda, SORBS, CBL, UCEProtect. Results may change over time.
128.14.239.38 has been assigned a threat score of 70/100 (High). This classifies it as a high-severity threat. Proactive blocking is recommended for sensitive infrastructure.
The following attack categories were identified:
IP address 128.14.239.38 has been traced to Taipei, Taiwan, operating on the network of Zenlayer Inc. Our threat detection systems have flagged this address based on observed malicious behavior patterns. The address has been active for 1 days in our monitoring system, producing 15 flagged requests at a rate of ~15/day. Operating from datacenter infrastructure, this IP is typical of addresses used in organized attack operations. Cloud and VPS providers are commonly exploited as launching platforms for automated scanning. Two attack patterns were identified (Path Enumeration and User-Agent Anomaly), suggesting a semi-automated campaign that targets multiple vulnerabilities. Our records show 405 malicious IPs originating from Taiwan, positioning it as a significant contributor to global threat activity. The score of 70/100 indicates a confirmed malicious actor. Network-level blocking is appropriate.
This IP belongs to a hosting or data center provider. Malicious traffic from hosting infrastructure often originates from compromised VPS instances, rented servers used for scanning campaigns, or abused free-tier cloud accounts. Hosting providers typically respond to abuse reports within 24-72 hours.
TLS fingerprinting creates unique identifiers based on how clients negotiate encrypted connections. The JA3 and JA4 methods generate hashes from TLS ClientHello parameters, enabling identification of specific tools and malware regardless of IP address changes.
Credential stuffing uses stolen username-password pairs from data breaches to attempt logins across many websites. Since users frequently reuse passwords, these automated attacks achieve success rates of 0.1-2%, which translates to thousands of compromised accounts from millions of attempts.