
ABUSE.MOM — BEHAVE OR GET EXPOSED
| Signature | Description | Points | Severity |
|---|---|---|---|
| UA changed for same IP | Multiple User-Agents — bot rotation technique | +25 | |
| Burst: 10 req / 10s | Abnormally fast request rate — automated scanning | +35 | |
| Foreign referer seen | Referer from unrelated external domain | +10 |
Reconstructed HTTP requests from server access logs. Target domains redacted for security.
* Typical request patterns for detected signatures. Actual target domains are redacted.
IP 117.143.82.33 shows suspicious UA behavior. Block empty User-Agent requests. Implement JavaScript-based bot detection for sensitive endpoints.
IP 117.143.82.33 is generating excessive traffic. Limit connections per source IP. Enable geographic blocking if traffic from this region is unexpected.
This IP was checked against major DNS-based blacklists used by mail servers and firewalls worldwide.
Checked: Spamhaus, SpamCop, Barracuda, SORBS, CBL, UCEProtect. Results may change over time.
117.143.82.33 has been assigned a threat score of 70/100 (High). At this threat level, the IP is considered high risk. Firewall rules should be updated to deny traffic from this source.
The following attack categories were identified:
The address 117.143.82.33 originates from Shanghai, China, operating on the network of China Mobile communications corporation. It was identified through automated analysis of incoming network traffic across monitored endpoints. During its 1-day observation window, we recorded 1 hostile requests from this IP — roughly 1 per day on average. The address belongs to a mobile carrier network. The sustained pattern of malicious requests indicates either a compromised device or deliberate abuse. The dual attack vectors of User-Agent Anomaly combined with Request Flooding indicate a coordinated assault rather than opportunistic scanning. Our records show 103 malicious IPs originating from China, positioning it as a significant contributor to global threat activity. At 70/100, this IP warrants immediate defensive action.
Analyzing User-Agent strings reveals automated tools masquerading as legitimate browsers. Inconsistencies between claimed browser capabilities and actual behavior, impossible version combinations, and known scanner signatures help identify malicious clients.
The RaaS model allows technically unskilled criminals to deploy sophisticated ransomware through affiliate programs. Operators provide the malware, infrastructure, and negotiation services, taking a percentage of ransom payments from their affiliates.