
ABUSE.MOM — BEHAVE OR GET EXPOSED
| Signature | Description | Points | Severity |
|---|---|---|---|
| UA changed for same IP | Multiple User-Agents — bot rotation technique | +25 | |
| Danger medium hits: 30 | Medium-risk: admin panels, config files | +60 | |
| 404 ratio 40-60% | Majority of requests returned 404 — enumeration | +15 | |
| Probe pattern 302->404 same path | Behavioral anomaly detected by automated analysis | +20 | |
| Foreign referer seen | Referer from unrelated external domain | +10 | |
| Imported from old blocklist | Behavioral anomaly detected by automated analysis | +0 | |
| Danger medium hits: 10 | Medium-risk: admin panels, config files | +60 | |
| Danger medium hits: 6 | Medium-risk: admin panels, config files | +60 | |
| Danger medium hits: 4 | Medium-risk: admin panels, config files | +40 | |
| Danger medium hits: 20 | Medium-risk: admin panels, config files | +60 | |
| Burst: 5 req / 2s | Abnormally fast request rate — automated scanning | +35 | |
| Danger strong hits: 3 | High-risk paths: shells, RCE vectors, exploits | +75 | |
| Danger medium hits: 12 | Medium-risk: admin panels, config files | +60 |
Reconstructed HTTP requests from server access logs. Target domains redacted for security.
* Typical request patterns for detected signatures. Actual target domains are redacted.
Address UA spoofing from 113.192.47.123: maintain blocklist of known malicious UA strings, require consistent UA across sessions, implement TLS fingerprinting.
IP 113.192.47.123 is enumerating directories. Configure fail2ban apache-404 jail after 10+ 404 errors. Disable directory listings. Normalize all 404 responses.
Implement limit_req_zone in nginx. Deploy CDN with DDoS protection. Configure SYN cookies and connection tracking to throttle 113.192.47.123.
Network reconnaissance data from Shodan. Open ports may indicate running services, misconfigurations, or potential attack surfaces.
| Port | Service | Risk | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| 88 | Unknown | Low | Service on port 88 |
| 2000 | Unknown | Low | Service on port 2000 |
| 8291 | MikroTik | High | MikroTik Winbox — router management, targeted by VPNFilter malware |
⚠️ Network scanning reveals 1 dangerous service exposed on 113.192.47.123. These services should not be publicly accessible without strict firewall rules.
| CVE ID | Link |
|---|---|
| CVE-2024-54772 | NVD → |
| CVE-2022-45313 | NVD → |
| CVE-2022-45315 | NVD → |
| CVE-2021-3014 | NVD → |
| CVE-2018-5951 | NVD → |
🔴 This host has 5 known CVEs associated with its exposed services. Multiple vulnerabilities suggest gaps in patch management. Review each CVE in the NVD database.
Data source: Shodan InternetDB. Scanned independently of abuse.mom.
This IP was checked against major DNS-based blacklists used by mail servers and firewalls worldwide.
Checked: Spamhaus, SpamCop, Barracuda, SORBS, CBL, UCEProtect. Results may change over time.
113.192.47.123 has been assigned a threat score of 240/100 (Critical). This is a critical-level threat. Systems administrators should treat this IP as hostile and block all inbound connections without exception.
The following attack categories were identified:
Network traffic from 113.192.47.123, located in Lahore, Pakistan, operating on the network of IN CABLE INTERNET (PRIVATE) LIMITED, has been classified as malicious by our automated threat scoring engine. During its 82-day observation window, we recorded 98 hostile requests from this IP — roughly 1.2 per day on average. Operating from a residential network, this IP may represent a compromised home gateway or IoT device that has been drafted into a larger attack infrastructure. The diversity of 3 separate attack methods suggests a comprehensive attack toolkit — likely an automated scanner that tests for vulnerabilities across multiple categories. Pakistan currently accounts for 122 blocked IPs in our database, making it a significant source of malicious traffic. A score of 240/100 places this address in the top tier of severity. Block and investigate any historical connections.
This IP is classified as residential, suggesting it may belong to a compromised home device, IoT botnet member, or an infected personal computer. Residential IPs involved in attacks often indicate malware infection without the owner's knowledge.
TLS fingerprinting creates unique identifiers based on how clients negotiate encrypted connections. The JA3 and JA4 methods generate hashes from TLS ClientHello parameters, enabling identification of specific tools and malware regardless of IP address changes.
Passive DNS databases record historical DNS resolution data, enabling analysts to track domain changes, identify related infrastructure, and discover malicious domains sharing hosting with known threats. This historical context is invaluable for threat investigation.