
ABUSE.MOM — BEHAVE OR GET EXPOSED
| Signature | Description | Points | Severity |
|---|---|---|---|
| Burst 8/2s | Abnormally fast request rate — automated scanning | +35 | |
| UA changed | Multiple User-Agents — bot rotation technique | +25 |
Reconstructed HTTP requests from server access logs. Target domains redacted for security.
* Typical request patterns for detected signatures. Actual target domains are redacted.
Implement limit_req_zone in nginx. Deploy CDN with DDoS protection. Configure SYN cookies and connection tracking to throttle 109.198.240.83.
IP 109.198.240.83 shows suspicious UA behavior. Block empty User-Agent requests. Implement JavaScript-based bot detection for sensitive endpoints.
This IP was checked against major DNS-based blacklists used by mail servers and firewalls worldwide.
Checked: Spamhaus, SpamCop, Barracuda, SORBS, CBL, UCEProtect. Results may change over time.
109.198.240.83 has been assigned a threat score of 60/100 (High). This score indicates high threat severity. The IP has shown clear patterns of malicious behavior that warrant immediate defensive measures.
The following attack categories were identified:
109.198.240.83 is registered in Yekaterinburg, Russia, operating on the network of Comstar EKB. This IP first appeared in our threat feeds after triggering multiple behavioral detection signatures. During its 4-day observation window, we recorded 140 hostile requests from this IP — roughly 35 per day on average. This is a residential IP address, suggesting a compromised home device such as a router, smart appliance, or infected workstation participating in a botnet. Two attack patterns were identified (Request Flooding and User-Agent Anomaly), suggesting a semi-automated campaign that targets multiple vulnerabilities. With 2,651 flagged addresses, Russia represents a major presence in our threat database. At 60/100, this IP presents a meaningful threat. Implement rate limiting with escalation to blocking.
This IP is classified as residential, suggesting it may belong to a compromised home device, IoT botnet member, or an infected personal computer. Residential IPs involved in attacks often indicate malware infection without the owner's knowledge.
Distributed denial of service attacks overwhelm infrastructure with traffic volume. Effective mitigation combines always-on traffic scrubbing, anycast network distribution, rate limiting, and the ability to quickly scale absorption capacity during attacks.
WebSocket connections bypass traditional HTTP security controls, creating opportunities for cross-site WebSocket hijacking, denial of service, and data injection. Proper origin validation, authentication, and message rate limiting are essential for secure WebSocket implementations.