
ABUSE.MOM — BEHAVE OR GET EXPOSED
| Signature | Description | Points | Severity |
|---|---|---|---|
| 404 ratio >= 60% | Majority of requests returned 404 — enumeration | +25 | |
| Burst 10/2s | Abnormally fast request rate — automated scanning | +35 | |
| Burst 11/10s | Abnormally fast request rate — automated scanning | +35 | |
| Burst 11/2s | Abnormally fast request rate — automated scanning | +35 | |
| Burst 13/10s | Abnormally fast request rate — automated scanning | +35 | |
| Burst 14/10s | Abnormally fast request rate — automated scanning | +35 | |
| Burst 15/10s | Abnormally fast request rate — automated scanning | +35 | |
| Burst 16/10s | Abnormally fast request rate — automated scanning | +35 | |
| Burst 7/2s | Abnormally fast request rate — automated scanning | +35 | |
| Burst 8/2s | Abnormally fast request rate — automated scanning | +35 | |
| Burst 9/2s | Abnormally fast request rate — automated scanning | +35 | |
| Danger medium hits: 1 | Medium-risk: admin panels, config files | +10 | |
| Danger medium hits: 6 | Medium-risk: admin panels, config files | +60 | |
| Danger strong hits: 2 | High-risk paths: shells, RCE vectors, exploits | +50 | |
| Danger strong hits: 7 | High-risk paths: shells, RCE vectors, exploits | +100 | |
| Foreign referer | Referer from unrelated external domain | +10 | |
| POST seen | Behavioral anomaly detected by automated analysis | +8 | |
| UA bot: python | Known bot/crawler User-Agent detected | +40 | |
| UA changed | Multiple User-Agents — bot rotation technique | +25 |
Reconstructed HTTP requests from server access logs. Target domains redacted for security.
* Typical request patterns for detected signatures. Actual target domains are redacted.
Block scanning from 107.189.6.149: rate-limit 404 responses per IP, deploy a honeypot 404 page, ensure no backup files are web-accessible.
Implement limit_req_zone in nginx. Deploy CDN with DDoS protection. Configure SYN cookies and connection tracking to throttle 107.189.6.149.
Address UA spoofing from 107.189.6.149: maintain blocklist of known malicious UA strings, require consistent UA across sessions, implement TLS fingerprinting.
Other blocked IPs from the same /24 subnet — indicates systematic abuse from this network range.
This IP was checked against major DNS-based blacklists used by mail servers and firewalls worldwide.
Checked: Spamhaus, SpamCop, Barracuda, SORBS, CBL, UCEProtect. Results may change over time.
107.189.6.149 has been assigned a threat score of 338/100 (Critical). With this rating, the IP falls into the critical severity bracket — among the most dangerous addresses in our monitoring database.
The following attack categories were identified:
107.189.6.149 is registered in Roost, LU, operating on the network of FranTech Solutions. This IP first appeared in our threat feeds after triggering multiple behavioral detection signatures. Our sensors captured 1,805 malicious requests from this address across a 44-day span, reflecting a sustained attack cadence of ~41 requests per day. The IP is classified as hosting/datacenter infrastructure, commonly associated with rented servers used for automated attack campaigns, botnet command-and-control, or vulnerability scanning at scale. The combination of 3 distinct attack vectors indicates a sophisticated, multi-pronged threat actor deploying automated tools that probe multiple attack surfaces simultaneously. Our records show 45 malicious IPs originating from LU, positioning it as a notable contributor to global threat activity. At 338/100, this is an extremely high-risk address. All traffic should be considered hostile.
This IP belongs to a hosting or data center provider. Malicious traffic from hosting infrastructure often originates from compromised VPS instances, rented servers used for scanning campaigns, or abused free-tier cloud accounts. Hosting providers typically respond to abuse reports within 24-72 hours.
Distributed denial of service attacks overwhelm infrastructure with traffic volume. Effective mitigation combines always-on traffic scrubbing, anycast network distribution, rate limiting, and the ability to quickly scale absorption capacity during attacks.
Request smuggling exploits differences in how front-end and back-end servers parse HTTP requests. This technique can bypass security controls, poison web caches, and hijack other users sessions by desynchronizing request boundaries.