
ABUSE.MOM — BEHAVE OR GET EXPOSED
| Signature | Description | Points | Severity |
|---|---|---|---|
| UA bot: Go-http-client | Known bot/crawler User-Agent detected | +40 | |
| UA changed for same IP | Multiple User-Agents — bot rotation technique | +25 | |
| 404 ratio 40-60% | Majority of requests returned 404 — enumeration | +15 | |
| Probe pattern 302->404 same path | Behavioral anomaly detected by automated analysis | +20 | |
| Foreign referer seen | Referer from unrelated external domain | +10 | |
| UA suspicious (short/empty) | Behavioral anomaly detected by automated analysis | +15 | |
| 404 ratio >= 60% | Majority of requests returned 404 — enumeration | +25 |
Reconstructed HTTP requests from server access logs. Target domains redacted for security.
* Typical request patterns for detected signatures. Actual target domains are redacted.
Address UA spoofing from 107.175.75.13: maintain blocklist of known malicious UA strings, require consistent UA across sessions, implement TLS fingerprinting.
Block scanning from 107.175.75.13: rate-limit 404 responses per IP, deploy a honeypot 404 page, ensure no backup files are web-accessible.
Other blocked IPs from the same /24 subnet — indicates systematic abuse from this network range.
Network reconnaissance data from Shodan. Open ports may indicate running services, misconfigurations, or potential attack surfaces.
| Port | Service | Risk | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| 22 | SSH | Low | Secure Shell — common brute force target for remote access |
| CVE ID | Link |
|---|---|
| CVE-2023-51385 | NVD → |
| CVE-2019-6110 | NVD → |
| CVE-2020-14145 | NVD → |
| CVE-2023-51767 | NVD → |
| CVE-2007-2768 | NVD → |
| CVE-2019-6111 | NVD → |
| CVE-2020-15778 | NVD → |
| CVE-2017-15906 | NVD → |
| CVE-2023-48795 | NVD → |
| CVE-2021-36368 | NVD → |
| CVE-2023-38408 | NVD → |
| CVE-2008-3844 | NVD → |
| CVE-2025-26465 | NVD → |
| CVE-2018-15919 | NVD → |
| CVE-2016-20012 | NVD → |
| CVE-2025-32728 | NVD → |
| CVE-2021-41617 | NVD → |
| CVE-2018-15473 | NVD → |
| CVE-2019-6109 | NVD → |
| CVE-2018-20685 | NVD → |
🔴 This host has 20 known CVEs associated with its exposed services. This volume strongly suggests severely outdated software. Review each CVE in the NVD database.
Data source: Shodan InternetDB. Scanned independently of abuse.mom.
This IP was checked against major DNS-based blacklists used by mail servers and firewalls worldwide.
Checked: Spamhaus, SpamCop, Barracuda, SORBS, CBL, UCEProtect. Results may change over time.
107.175.75.13 has been assigned a threat score of 110/100 (Critical). This represents a critical risk level. Our detection systems have flagged multiple high-confidence indicators of malicious intent from this address.
The following attack categories were identified:
The address 107.175.75.13 originates from Buffalo, United States, operating on the network of HostPapa. It was identified through automated analysis of incoming network traffic across monitored endpoints. Our sensors captured 29 malicious requests from this address across a 22-day span, reflecting a sustained attack cadence of ~1.3 requests per day. The IP is classified as hosting/datacenter infrastructure, commonly associated with rented servers used for automated attack campaigns, botnet command-and-control, or vulnerability scanning at scale. Two attack patterns were identified (User-Agent Anomaly and Path Enumeration), suggesting a semi-automated campaign that targets multiple vulnerabilities. United States currently accounts for 199 blocked IPs in our database, making it a significant source of malicious traffic. With a threat score of 110/100, this IP is among the most dangerous addresses in our database. Immediate and complete blocking is strongly recommended.
This IP belongs to a hosting or data center provider. Malicious traffic from hosting infrastructure often originates from compromised VPS instances, rented servers used for scanning campaigns, or abused free-tier cloud accounts. Hosting providers typically respond to abuse reports within 24-72 hours.
TLS fingerprinting creates unique identifiers based on how clients negotiate encrypted connections. The JA3 and JA4 methods generate hashes from TLS ClientHello parameters, enabling identification of specific tools and malware regardless of IP address changes.
Internet of Things devices are prime targets for botnet recruitment due to weak default credentials, infrequent updates, and always-on connectivity. Compromised IoT devices generate persistent scanning and attack traffic without their owners knowledge.