IP Threat Report
106.75.28.174
ABUSE.MOM — BEHAVE OR GET EXPOSED
Geolocation & Classification
Detection Signatures
| Signature | Description | Points | Severity |
|---|---|---|---|
| UA bot: Go-http-client | Known bot/crawler User-Agent detected | +40 | |
| UA changed for same IP | Multiple User-Agents — bot rotation technique | +25 | |
| 404 ratio >= 60% | Majority of requests returned 404 — enumeration | +25 | |
| 404 ratio 40-60% | Majority of requests returned 404 — enumeration | +15 | |
| Burst: 6 req / 2s | Abnormally fast request rate — automated scanning | +35 | |
| Burst: 10 req / 10s | Abnormally fast request rate — automated scanning | +35 | |
| Foreign referer seen | Referer from unrelated external domain | +10 |
Observed Activity
Reconstructed HTTP requests from server access logs. Target domains redacted for security.
* Typical request patterns for detected signatures. Actual target domains are redacted.
Timeline
Network Provider
Recommendations
Actions taken & recommended
- IP 106.75.28.174 is blocked at application level (HTTP 403)
- Consider blocking at firewall level (iptables/CSF) to reduce server load
- Other malicious IPs detected in the same /24 subnet — consider blocking 106.75.28.0/24
- Report abuse to the network provider via their abuse contact
- Ensure sensitive files (.env, .git, backups) are not accessible from the web
🤖 Bot Detection
Address UA spoofing from 106.75.28.174: maintain blocklist of known malicious UA strings, require consistent UA across sessions, implement TLS fingerprinting.
🔎 Path Enumeration Protection
Block scanning from 106.75.28.174: rate-limit 404 responses per IP, deploy a honeypot 404 page, ensure no backup files are web-accessible.
🌊 Flood / DDoS Mitigation
Implement limit_req_zone in nginx. Deploy CDN with DDoS protection. Configure SYN cookies and connection tracking to throttle 106.75.28.174.
Neighbors in 106.75.28.0/24
Other blocked IPs from the same /24 subnet — indicates systematic abuse from this network range.
Blacklist Status (DNSBL)
This IP was checked against major DNS-based blacklists used by mail servers and firewalls worldwide.
Checked: Spamhaus, SpamCop, Barracuda, SORBS, CBL, UCEProtect. Results may change over time.
Threat Analysis
106.75.28.174 has been assigned a threat score of 160/100 (Critical). A score this high marks a critical threat actor. This address has demonstrated persistent, aggressive malicious behavior across multiple detection vectors.
The following attack categories were identified:
📊 Threat Analysis
106.75.28.174 is registered in Yangpu, China, operating on the network of UCLOUD. This IP first appeared in our threat feeds after triggering multiple behavioral detection signatures. Our sensors captured 2 malicious requests from this address across a 18-day span, reflecting a sustained attack cadence of ~0.1 requests per day. The IP is classified as hosting/datacenter infrastructure, commonly associated with rented servers used for automated attack campaigns, botnet command-and-control, or vulnerability scanning at scale. With 3 different attack patterns detected, this IP exhibits behavior characteristic of advanced automated scanning frameworks. China currently accounts for 194 blocked IPs in our database, making it a significant source of malicious traffic. At 160/100, this is an extremely high-risk address. All traffic should be considered hostile.
This IP belongs to a hosting or data center provider. Malicious traffic from hosting infrastructure often originates from compromised VPS instances, rented servers used for scanning campaigns, or abused free-tier cloud accounts. Hosting providers typically respond to abuse reports within 24-72 hours.
Related Threats
Security Intelligence
💡 HTTP Header Analysis for Threat Detection
Examining HTTP headers beyond User-Agent reveals attack tools and automated scripts. Missing standard headers, unusual ordering, non-standard values, and inconsistencies with claimed client identity all serve as reliable detection signals.
💡 Watering Hole Attack Strategy
Watering hole attacks compromise websites frequently visited by target organizations. Rather than attacking targets directly, adversaries infect trusted resources, exploiting the inherent trust users place in regularly visited sites.