
ABUSE.MOM — BEHAVE OR GET EXPOSED
| Signature | Description | Points | Severity |
|---|---|---|---|
| Danger medium hits: 3 | Medium-risk: admin panels, config files | +30 | |
| Danger strong hits: 3 | High-risk paths: shells, RCE vectors, exploits | +75 |
Reconstructed HTTP requests from server access logs. Target domains redacted for security.
* Typical request patterns for detected signatures. Actual target domains are redacted.
Block 104.234.4.48 at the network perimeter. Implement defense-in-depth combining IP blocking with application-layer protections.
Other blocked IPs from the same /24 subnet — indicates systematic abuse from this network range.
This IP was checked against major DNS-based blacklists used by mail servers and firewalls worldwide.
Checked: Spamhaus, SpamCop, Barracuda, SORBS, CBL, UCEProtect. Results may change over time.
104.234.4.48 has been assigned a threat score of 105/100 (Critical). A score this high marks a critical threat actor. This address has demonstrated persistent, aggressive malicious behavior across multiple detection vectors.
Threat intelligence analysis has linked 104.234.4.48 to malicious activity originating from Giza, EG, operating on the network of MEVSPACE sp. z o.o.. The address has been under observation since its initial detection. Over a period of 4 days, this IP generated 196 malicious requests, averaging approximately 49 requests per day. This address belongs to a datacenter or cloud hosting provider. Hosting IPs are frequently leveraged by threat actors who rent cheap VPS instances specifically for conducting attacks. With 85 flagged addresses, EG represents a notable presence in our threat database. At 105/100, this is an extremely high-risk address. All traffic should be considered hostile.
This IP belongs to a hosting or data center provider. Malicious traffic from hosting infrastructure often originates from compromised VPS instances, rented servers used for scanning campaigns, or abused free-tier cloud accounts. Hosting providers typically respond to abuse reports within 24-72 hours.
Request smuggling exploits differences in how front-end and back-end servers parse HTTP requests. This technique can bypass security controls, poison web caches, and hijack other users sessions by desynchronizing request boundaries.
Internet traffic routing through a limited number of submarine cables and exchange points creates natural chokepoints. Understanding these routing patterns helps explain geographic clustering of certain attack types and latency-based scanning behaviors.