
ABUSE.MOM — BEHAVE OR GET EXPOSED
| Signature | Description | Points | Severity |
|---|---|---|---|
| Danger medium hits: 4 | Medium-risk: admin panels, config files | +40 | |
| Danger strong hits: 6 | High-risk paths: shells, RCE vectors, exploits | +100 | |
| Foreign referer | Referer from unrelated external domain | +10 | |
| POST seen | Behavioral anomaly detected by automated analysis | +8 |
Reconstructed HTTP requests from server access logs. Target domains redacted for security.
* Typical request patterns for detected signatures. Actual target domains are redacted.
Add 103.129.161.234 to your firewall blocklist. Review logs for successful connections. Enable comprehensive logging on all public-facing services.
This IP was checked against major DNS-based blacklists used by mail servers and firewalls worldwide.
Checked: Spamhaus, SpamCop, Barracuda, SORBS, CBL, UCEProtect. Results may change over time.
103.129.161.234 has been assigned a threat score of 158/100 (Critical). With this rating, the IP falls into the critical severity bracket — among the most dangerous addresses in our monitoring database.
The address 103.129.161.234 originates from Taipei, Taiwan, operating on the network of Arisk Communications inc.. It was identified through automated analysis of incoming network traffic across monitored endpoints. During its 6-day observation window, we recorded 176 hostile requests from this IP — roughly 29.3 per day on average. This residential IP is likely a compromised consumer device. Home routers and IoT equipment with default credentials are prime targets for botnet operators. Our records show 405 malicious IPs originating from Taiwan, positioning it as a significant contributor to global threat activity. At 158/100, this is an extremely high-risk address. All traffic should be considered hostile.
This IP is classified as residential, suggesting it may belong to a compromised home device, IoT botnet member, or an infected personal computer. Residential IPs involved in attacks often indicate malware infection without the owner's knowledge.
SSRF attacks trick servers into making requests to internal resources that should not be publicly accessible. This can expose cloud metadata endpoints, internal APIs, and private network services, potentially leading to full infrastructure compromise.
Proper network segmentation limits the blast radius of breaches. Even if attackers compromise one segment, properly configured network boundaries prevent lateral movement to critical systems, databases, and administrative interfaces.