
ABUSE.MOM — BEHAVE OR GET EXPOSED
| Signature | Description | Points | Severity |
|---|---|---|---|
| Burst 5/2s | Abnormally fast request rate — automated scanning | +35 | |
| Foreign referer | Referer from unrelated external domain | +10 | |
| UA changed | Multiple User-Agents — bot rotation technique | +25 |
Reconstructed HTTP requests from server access logs. Target domains redacted for security.
* Typical request patterns for detected signatures. Actual target domains are redacted.
IP 100.53.102.180 is generating excessive traffic. Limit connections per source IP. Enable geographic blocking if traffic from this region is unexpected.
Address UA spoofing from 100.53.102.180: maintain blocklist of known malicious UA strings, require consistent UA across sessions, implement TLS fingerprinting.
Other blocked IPs from the same /24 subnet — indicates systematic abuse from this network range.
100.53.102.180 has been assigned a threat score of 70/100 (High). The IP is rated as a high-level threat. Network administrators should implement blocking rules and monitor for any connections from this address.
The following attack categories were identified:
IP address 100.53.102.180 has been traced to Ashburn, United States, operating on the network of Amazon.com, Inc.. Our threat detection systems have flagged this address based on observed malicious behavior patterns. The address has been active for 1 days in our monitoring system, producing 4 flagged requests at a rate of ~4/day. Classified as a hosting IP, this address likely runs on a rented server or cloud instance. Attackers prefer datacenter IPs for their high bandwidth and disposable nature. The dual attack vectors of Request Flooding combined with User-Agent Anomaly indicate a coordinated assault rather than opportunistic scanning. With 202 flagged addresses, United States represents a significant presence in our threat database. The score of 70/100 indicates a confirmed malicious actor. Network-level blocking is appropriate.
This IP belongs to a hosting or data center provider. Malicious traffic from hosting infrastructure often originates from compromised VPS instances, rented servers used for scanning campaigns, or abused free-tier cloud accounts. Hosting providers typically respond to abuse reports within 24-72 hours.
Distributed denial of service attacks overwhelm infrastructure with traffic volume. Effective mitigation combines always-on traffic scrubbing, anycast network distribution, rate limiting, and the ability to quickly scale absorption capacity during attacks.
CDNs can inadvertently mask the true origin of malicious traffic, making attribution difficult. Attackers abuse CDN services to proxy their attacks, leverage cached content for amplification, and exploit misconfigurations in CDN-to-origin connections.