
ABUSE.MOM — BEHAVE OR GET EXPOSED
| Signature | Description | Points | Severity |
|---|---|---|---|
| UA changed for same IP | Multiple User-Agents — bot rotation technique | +25 | |
| Burst: 5 req / 2s | Abnormally fast request rate — automated scanning | +35 | |
| Foreign referer seen | Referer from unrelated external domain | +10 |
Reconstructed HTTP requests from server access logs. Target domains redacted for security.
* Typical request patterns for detected signatures. Actual target domains are redacted.
Address UA spoofing from 100.30.171.48: maintain blocklist of known malicious UA strings, require consistent UA across sessions, implement TLS fingerprinting.
Implement limit_req_zone in nginx. Deploy CDN with DDoS protection. Configure SYN cookies and connection tracking to throttle 100.30.171.48.
This IP was checked against major DNS-based blacklists used by mail servers and firewalls worldwide.
Checked: Spamhaus, SpamCop, Barracuda, SORBS, CBL, UCEProtect. Results may change over time.
100.30.171.48 has been assigned a threat score of 70/100 (High). This classifies it as a high-severity threat. Proactive blocking is recommended for sensitive infrastructure.
The following attack categories were identified:
Our monitoring infrastructure has identified 100.30.171.48, geolocated to Ashburn, United States, operating on the network of Amazon.com, as a source of suspicious network activity. During its 1-day observation window, we recorded 1 hostile requests from this IP — roughly 1 per day on average. Operating from datacenter infrastructure, this IP is typical of addresses used in organized attack operations. Cloud and VPS providers are commonly exploited as launching platforms for automated scanning. Two attack patterns were identified (User-Agent Anomaly and Request Flooding), suggesting a semi-automated campaign that targets multiple vulnerabilities. United States currently accounts for 201 blocked IPs in our database, making it a significant source of malicious traffic. At 70/100, this IP warrants immediate defensive action.
This IP belongs to a hosting or data center provider. Malicious traffic from hosting infrastructure often originates from compromised VPS instances, rented servers used for scanning campaigns, or abused free-tier cloud accounts. Hosting providers typically respond to abuse reports within 24-72 hours.
Analyzing User-Agent strings reveals automated tools masquerading as legitimate browsers. Inconsistencies between claimed browser capabilities and actual behavior, impossible version combinations, and known scanner signatures help identify malicious clients.
Buffer overflow vulnerabilities remain relevant in C/C++ applications despite decades of mitigation efforts. Modern protections like ASLR, stack canaries, and DEP reduce exploitability but determined attackers continue finding bypass techniques.